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Remaining Heterogeneity in Trust Investment Law
after Twenty-Five Years of Reform
Trent S. Kiziah, Los Angeles, CA*
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”) has been enacted by fortyone states and the District of Columbia. Only Colorado has enacted the
UPIA without any changes. The remaining forty states and the District of
Columbia have made editorial and substantive changes which impact the
manner in which trust assets are invested in these states. This article examines the rich diversity of these modifications. This article also examines the laws in the nine states that have not officially adopted the UPIA
to determine if these states have enacted similar modern investment principles as expressed in the UPIA.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1952, Harry Markowitz revolutionized investing by shifting the
focus from viewing investments in isolation to viewing investments as
part of a portfolio of assets.1 At the time his paper was published, most
of states in the United States had in place a prudent man standard of
care, many of them modeled on the Model Prudent Man Rule Statute,
or a modified version thereof.2 The Model Prudent Man Rule Statute
1 Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77-91 (1952). For a discussion
of the Markowitz model see HERBERT B. MAYO, INVESTMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION, 170174 (7th ed. 2003)
2 Mayo Adams Shattuck, The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary
Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 502-04
(1951). At the annual meeting of the trust division of the American Bankers Association
in February 1942, the association instructed its legislative committee to prepare a model
statute designed to enact the Massachusetts rule set forth in Harvard College v. Amory,
26 Mass. 446, 473 (1830). Shattuck was the drafter of the Model Prudent Man Rule
Statute. For a list of the twenty states which adopted the Modern Prudent Man Rule
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found much of its wording from the 1830 opinion of Harvard College v.
Amory.3 The statute authorized the trustee to invest in every kind of
property subject to the limitation that the trustee invests with “prudence, discretion, and intelligence. . . not in regard to speculation but in
regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital.”4 While the
statute on its face appeared to be quite flexible, courts interpreted the
statute as requiring that each asset be viewed in isolation, labeled each
asset as either “prudent” or “speculative” resulting in many asset classes
as being off limits for fiduciaries, forbade trustees from delegating investment functions to professional advisors, surcharged trustees for
losses from any “speculative” investments while prohibiting the trustee
from offsetting losses with gains from other investments, encouraged
trustees to invest heavily in fixed income securities since they historically possessed less investment risk than stocks even though the highly
conservative investment mix resulted in a real loss in the purchasing
power of the trust in an inflationary environment, and prohibited investments in non-income producing property.5 Commentators began to call
for investment reform in the 1970s and 1980s.6 In the trust arena, reform began in 1985 and has continued for a quarter-century.7
Both California and Washington modified their Model Prudent
Man Rule Statutes in 1984 (effective January 1, 1985) by directing the
trustee to “give due consideration to the role that the proposed investment or investment course of action plays within the overall portfolio of
assets”8 (described as a “total asset management” approach in the
Statute and the states which had established the prudent man standard by common law,
see pages 502-503 of Shattuck’s article.
3 Shattuck, supra note 2, at 501; Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. at 473.
4 Shattuck, supra note 2, at 509.
5 BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT
MAN RULE 12-22, 36-41 (Oxford University Press 1986); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling
Survival of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 66-74 (1987); Joel
C. Dobris, Speculating on the Idea of “Speculation” in Trust Investing: An Essay, 39 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 439, 441-51 (2004); Austin Fleming, Prudent Investments: The Varying Standards of Prudence, 12 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 243, 248 -51 (1977).
6 Fleming, supra note 5, at 248 -51; LONGSTRETH, supra note 5, at 18-21.
7 Reform began in 1972 in the charitable area with the promulgation of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) also imposed modern investment principles on trustees of
retirement funds. See Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REV. 960 (1974); Note,
Fiduciary Responsibility and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 12
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 285 (1977); LONGSTRETH, supra note 5, at 22-36; Edward C.
Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1151
(1992); see infra note 15 and accompanying text.
8 WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.020(1) (2012).
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Washington statute9) or directing the trustee to consider “individual investments as part of an overall investment strategy.”10 California’s statute required the trustee to consider the “general economic conditions
and the anticipated needs of the trust and its beneficiaries.”11 Washington’s statute required the trustee to consider these same two factors but
also required the trustee to consider the marketability of investments;
length of the term of the investments; duration of the trust; liquidity
needs; other assets of the beneficiaries, including their earning capacity;
and the effect of investments in increasing or diminishing liability for
taxes.12 California’s statute deleted the troublesome phrase, “not in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of funds,
considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of the
capital.”13
In 1986, Minnesota amended its trust investment statute by adopting a statute similar to Washington’s.14 Delaware, Georgia, and Tennessee followed suit thereafter adopting statutes similar to California’s.15
Delaware added the phrase, “[a]ny determination of liability for investment performance shall consider not only the performance of a particular investment, but also the performance of the portfolio as a whole.”16
9

Id.
1984 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 149 (effective Jan. 1, 1985); 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1872, § 1
(effective Jan. 1, 1985). For an analysis of the 1984 California law, see William P. Wade,
The New California Prudent Investor Rule: A Statutory Interpretive Analysis, 20 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1 (1985).
11 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2261(a)(1) (West 1985) restated in CAL. PROB. CODE §16040(b)
(West 2012).
12 WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.020(1).
13 Prior to the 1984 amendment of California Civil Code § 2261(1), the statute
modeled on the Model Prudent Man Rule Statute provided the trustee was to
exercise the judgment and care, under the circumstances then prevailing, which
men of prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent
disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of their capital.
This language was interpreted by the courts to forbid certain investment classes, thereby
prohibiting trustees from investing in certain investment opportunities. See Fleming,
supra note 5, at 251; See also LONGSTRETH, supra note 5, at 22. (“The most striking features of the new statute [referring to the 1984 California statute] are the elimination of
the classic language prohibiting ‘speculation,’ the specific directions to take into account
general economic conditions (presumably including inflation) and the particular needs of
the trust, and, most strikingly, the instructions to consider individual investments as part
of an overall investment strategy.”).
14 1986 Minn. Laws ch. 442, § 7 (effective Mar. 25, 1986).
15 65 Del. Laws ch. 422 (1986) (effective July 3, 1986); 1988 Ga. Laws 725 (effective
Jan. 1, 1988); 1989 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 288, § 2 (effective in 1989).
16 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(c)(3) (2011).
10
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Georgia and Tennessee added similar sentences.17 Alabama, Nevada,
South Carolina, Texas, and Iowa (in that order) followed suit following
California’s statute for the most part.18
Illinois enacted the first “prudent investor” statute based on a tentative draft of the America Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of
Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule (1992).19 Illinois’s statute required the
trustee to invest the trust assets as a “prudent investor,” viewing assets
“not in isolation, but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole and
as part of an overall investment strategy that should incorporate risk
and return objectives reasonably suited to the trust.”20 “No specific investment or course of action” was deemed imprudent.21 The trustee
was specifically required to invest bearing in mind the “possible effect of
inflation.”22
North Dakota and Virginia enacted modern investment statutes following the precedent of Washington and California.23 Florida and Kansas enacted statutes modeled after Illinois’s statute.24 In summary,
before the UPIA was adopted by the Uniform Commissioners in 1994,
sixteen states had enacted modern investment provisions with three of
those states modeled on a draft of the Restatement’s Prudent Investor
Rule.25
17

GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-340(c) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-3-117 (2012).
1989 Ala. Acts 89-813; 2007 Iowa Acts ch. 36, sec. 3, § 633.123; 1989 Nev. Stat.
181; 1990 S.C. Acts No. 521, § 92(A); 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 876, § 1.
19 1992 Ill. Laws 87-715. See the Prefatory Note to the UPIA for a brief history of
the literature and legislation with a specific reference to the Illinois law. For an analysis
of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS Prudent Investor Rule (2003), see Edward C.
Halbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1151
(1992).
20 760 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/5(a)(1) (2011).
21 5/5(a)(2).
22 5/5(a)(6).
23 1993 N.D. Laws ch. 583; 1992 Va. Acts ch. 810.
24 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-257; 1993 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 583.
25 The Illinois statute was modeled on an earlier draft of the Restatement’s Prudent
Investor Rule. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Kansas and Florida enacted
statutes modeled after Illinois’ statute. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Maryland enacted modern investment provisions (1994 Md. Laws ch. 602, § 1), effective Oct.
1, 1994, incorporating many of the investment provisions from the other enacted statutes
but not their wording. New York enacted modern investment provisions (1994 N.Y.
Laws 609), effective Jan. 1, 1995. While minor amendments have been enacted, for the
most part, Maryland and New York retained these original provisions. Maryland and
New York’s statutes were effective after the UPIA was adopted by the Commissioners
and thus are not included in the list of 16 states that had statutes in place prior to the
adoption.
18
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In 1994, the Uniform Commissioners adopted the UPIA. It made
five fundamental alterations to the former criteria of prudent investing,26 to wit:
(1) The standard of investment prudence was founded on the
total portfolio rather than individual investments. This standard is in sharp contrast to the former rule which determined
prudence by examining each investment in isolation rather
than determining how a particular investment operated in a total portfolio;27
(2) The fiduciary’s central consideration was identified as balancing risk and return. The former analysis examined each asset and determined whether it was prudent or speculative
viewed in isolation.28
(3) All categorical restrictions on types of investments were
abrogated. The Model Prudent Man Rule Statute permitted
the trustee to invest in every kind of property. But, as noted
previously, courts insisted that trustees avoid “speculation”
and issued opinions prohibiting numerous investment types.29
(4) Diversification was integrated into the definition of prudent investing. Under the prudent man rule, the states differed
on whether diversification was required or merely a factor to
consider in determining whether the trustee had acted
prudently.30
(5) Delegation was permitted. The prior law prohibited trustees from delegating investment decisions.31
Since its adoption by the Uniform Commissioners in 1994, forty-one
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UPIA, with most
of them making modifications, some of them material.32 Of the sixteen
26 The Prefatory Note to the Uniform Prudent Investor Act sets forth the five fundamental alterations. See NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIF.
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT (1994), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/
1990s/upia94.pdf at 1 [hereinafter UPIA].
27 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 ALA. CODE §§ 19-3B-901 to 19-3B-906 (2012); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.225 to
13.36.290 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-10901 to 14-10909 (2012); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 28-73-901 to 28-73-908 (2011); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 16045-16054 (West 2012);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-1.1-101 to 15-1.1-115 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-541 to
45a-541l (2012); D.C. CODE §§ 19-1309.01 to 19-1309.06 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT.
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states that had enacted modern investment provisions prior to the
UPIA, twelve have subsequently adopted the UPIA.33 The remaining
four states (Delaware, Florida, Georgia and Illinois) have retained their
original statutes.34
In Part I of this article, I examine the current state of trustee investment law in the United States with particular emphasis on whether, and
§§ 554c-1 to 554c-12 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 68-501 to 68-514 (2012); IND. CODE
§§ 30-4-3.5-1 to 30-4-3.5-13 (2011); IOWA CODE §§ 633A.4301 to 633A.4401 (2012); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 58-24a01 to 58-24a14 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, §§ 901-1104
(2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203C, §§ 1-11 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 700.1501 to
700.1512 (2012); MINN. STAT. § 501B.151 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 91-9-601 to 91-9627 (2011); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 469.900-469.913 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-34-602
to 72-34-610 (2011) ; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-3883 to 30-3889 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 164.705-164.775 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 564-B:9-901 to 564-B:9-907 (2011);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:20-11.1 to 3B:20-11.12 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-7-602
to 45-7-612 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36C-9-901 to 36C-9-907 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 59-17-01 to 59-17-06 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5809.01-5809.08 (LexisNexis
2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, §§ 175.60-175.72 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 130.750-130.775
(2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7203-7206 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-15-1 to 18-15-13
(2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-5-6 to 55-5-17
(2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-14-101 to 35-14-114 (2012); TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 117.001-117.012 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-7-901 to 75-7-907 (LexisNexis
2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 901-906 (2012); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-45.3 to 26-45.14
(2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.020 (2012); W. VA. CODE §§ 44-6C-1 to 44-6C-15
(2012); WIS. STAT. § 881.01 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-10-901 to 4-10-913 (2011).
On the Uniform Law Commission’s website (http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Prudent%20Investor%20Act (last visited Apr. 6, 2012)), the following states are not listed as
having adopted the UPIA: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, New York and South Dakota. Due to its recent enactment in 2010 Ga. Laws
131, effective Jan. 1, 2011, Georgia could be added to the list of states that have enacted
the UPIA; although, arguably, its changes may lead the Commissioners to continue its
exclusion from the list.
Of the states that have enacted the UPIA, Colorado is the only state that has made
absolutely no changes at all. New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island and West Virginia
have enacted the UPIA with minor editorial changes. Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Nebraska, North Dakota and Vermont have made minor substantive changes. The remaining states that have enacted the UPIA have made at least one significant
modification.
33 The UPIA was adopted by the following acts: 2006 Ala. Acts ch. 216 (effective
Jan. 1, 2007); 1995 Cal. Stat. ch. 63 (effective July 5, 1995); 1992 Iowa Acts ch. 125 § 61
(effective July 1, 1993); 2000 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 80 (effective July 1, 2000); 1996 Minn.
Laws ch. 314 (effective Jan. 1, 1997); 2003 Nev. Stat. ch. 355 (effective Nov. 1, 2003); 1997
N.D. Laws ch. 508 (effective Aug. 1, 1997); 2001 S.C. Acts No. 8, § 5 (effective July 18,
2001); 2002 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 216 (effective July 1, 2002); 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 1103
(effective Jan. 1, 2004); 1999 Va. Acts ch. 772 (effective Jan 1, 2000); 1995 Wash. Sess.
Laws ch. 307 (effective July 23, 1995).
34 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3301-06 (2011); FLA. STAT. §§ 518.10 to 518.112
(2012); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-12-340 to 53-12-345 (2011) (see supra note 32 concerning
Georgia’s recent enactment of legislation tracking in part the UPIA); and 760 ILL. COMP
STAT. 5/5.1 (2011).
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to what extent, the five fundamental principles set forth in the UPIA
have been enacted by the states. In Part II, I examine the other changes
that the states have made to the UPIA. In Part III, I point out the
significance of the article’s analysis. In Part IV, I make a few recommendations for reform.
I. FIVE FUNDAMENTAL INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES
As will be discussed in this Part, all of the states and the District of
Columbia have imposed upon corporate fiduciaries the duty to invest
trust assets in accordance with modern investment principles. Identical
investment duties have been imposed on individuals serving as trustee in
the District of Columbia and all of the states except in Kentucky and
Maryland. Kentucky’s modified version of the UPIA only applies to
banks and trust companies acting in a fiduciary capacity.35 The statute
does not apply to individuals who serve as trustee. Maryland’s prudent
investor’s statute applies to a trust company, an investment advisor that
is controlled by or under common control with a trust company, or to
any person that elects to have the statute apply.36 The Maryland statute
does not apply to an individual serving as trustee unless the person
elects to have the UPIA apply.37
A. Portfolio Investment Standard
Markowitz and those that followed him shifted the investment focus from examining each investment in isolation to a portfolio analysis
which examines how assets react with each other to changing market
conditions.38 UPIA § 2(b) provides:
A trustee’s investment and management decisions respecting
individual assets must be evaluated not in isolation but in the
context of the trust portfolio as a whole and as a part of an
overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives
reasonably suited to the trust.
UPIA § 2(b) “emphasizes the consolidated portfolio standard for evaluating investment decisions. An investment that might be imprudent
standing alone can become prudent if undertaken in sensible relation to
other trust assets, or to other nontrust assets.”39 The emphasis on investing as a whole is in sharp contrast to the prior law which focused on
each investment in isolation to determine if the investment was pru35
36
37
38
39

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.3-277(1) (West 2011).
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
§ 15-114(g).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
UPIA, supra note 26, § 2(b), cmt. (Portfolio standard).
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dent.40 All of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes which specifically direct the trustee to evaluate assets not in
isolation but in the context of the trust portfolio as a whole.41
40 The prior law is reflected in In re Bank of N.Y., 35 N.Y.2d 512, 517 (N.Y. 1974),
wherein the court stated: “[t]he fact that this portfolio showed substantial overall increase
in total value during the accounting period does not insulate the trustee from responsibility for imprudence with respect to individual investments for which it would otherwise be
surcharged” (citation omitted). See also Stephen P. Johnson, Trustee Investment: The
Prudent Person Rule or Modern Portfolio Theory, You Make the Choice, 44 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1175, 1180 (1993) (detailing an incident where the Supreme Court of Alabama
surcharged a trustee for making imprudent investments); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 96-97
(1987) (discussing the Prudent Man Rule in light of In re Bank of New York).
41 The following thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have enacted a provision identical or containing only slight editorial changes to UPIA § 2(b): ALA. CODE
§ 19-3B-901(b) (2012) (identical to UPIA); ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.230(b) (2012) (replaces “must” with “shall”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14–10902(B) (2012) (replaces
“must be evaluated not in isolation” with “shall not be evaluated in isolation”); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 28-73-902(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1.1-102(b)
(2012) (identical to UPIA); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541b(b) (2012) (replaces “must”
with “shall”); D.C. CODE § 19-1309.02(b) (2012) (identical except inserts a comma after
“isolation”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 554c-2(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA except inserts a
comma after “isolation”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-502(2) (2012) (identical to UPIA);
IND. CODE § 30-4-3.5-2(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); IOWA CODE § 633A.4302(2)
(2012) (identical to UPIA); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a02(b) (2011) (replaces “trustee”
with “fiduciary”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 902(2) (2011) (identical to UPIA); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 700.1503(1) (2012) (several editorial changes including replacing “must”
with “shall”); MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(2)(b) (2012) (identical to UPIA); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 91-9-603(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.902(2) (2011)
(identical to UPIA); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3884(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:9-902(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:2011.3(b) (West 2011) (several editorial changes including replacing “must be evaluated not
in isolation” with “shall not be evaluated in isolation”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-7-603(B)
(2011) (identical to UPIA); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-902(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-17-02(2) (2011) (identical to UPIA); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5809.02(C) (LexisNexis 2011) (inserts word “trust” before word “assets” and replaces
“must be evaluated not in isolation” with “shall not be evaluated in isolation”); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 60, § 175.62(B) (2011) (identical to UPIA except inserts a comma after word
“isolation”); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.755(2) (2012) (replaces “must be evaluated not in
isolation” with “are not evaluated in isolation” and inserts a comma after the word “isolation”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-15-2(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); S.C. CODE ANN. § 627-933(C)(2) (2011) (identical to UPIA); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-104(b) (2012) (identical to UPIA); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 117.004(b) (West 2011) (identical to UPIA);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-902(2) (LexisNexis 2011) (identical to UPIA); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14A, § 902(b) (2012) (identical to UPIA); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.4(B) (2012) (replaces “must” with “shall”); W. VA. CODE § 44-6C-2(b) (2012) (identical to UPIA); WIS.
STAT. § 881.01(3)(b) (2011) (several editorial changes including replacing “must” with
“shall”); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(b) (2011) (replaces “must” with “shall”).
The following fifteen state statutes have more than editorial changes to UPIA § 2(b),
but retain the emphasis on investing as part of an overall investment strategy: CAL. PROB.
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B. Tradeoff in Investing between Risk and Return
According to the UPIA, the fiduciary’s central consideration in investing is weighing the tradeoff between risk and return.42 According to
the comments to UPIA § 2:
[s]ubsection (b) also sounds the main theme of modern investment practice, sensitivity to the risk/return curve. . .. Returns
correlate strongly with risk, but tolerance for risk varies greatly
with the financial and other circumstances of the investor, or in
the case of a trust, with the purposes of the trust and the relevant circumstances of the beneficiaries.
Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have enacted a provision
which specifically states that the trustee must consider the risk and return tradeoff when investing trust assets.43 Delaware, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania and Washington emphasize investing as part of an overall
investment strategy, but their statutes do not specifically reference risk
and return.44 Why did these four legislatures leave out any reference to
CODE § 16047(b) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(b) (2011); FLA. STAT.
§ 518.11(1)(a) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-340(c) (2011); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
5(a)(1) (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.3-277 (West 2011) (in Kentucky, the UPIA
only applies to corporate fiduciaries, see supra note 35 and accompanying text); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2127 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(b)(3) (LexisNexis
2012) (in Maryland the UPIA applies to trust companies and investment advisors and
only to individual trustees who elect into the statute. See supra notes 36 and 37 and
accompanying text); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203C, § 3(b) (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7234-603(2) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.745(2) (2010); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 11-2.3(b)(3)(A) (McKinney 2011); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7213 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-7 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.020(1) (2012).
42 See UPIA, supra note 26, Prefatory Note.
43 See supra note 41 for the thirty-five states and the District of Columbia which
have enacted a provision identical to U.P.I.A. § 2(b) or have only made slight editorial
modifications.
Of the fifteen states that have made more than editorial changes to § 2(b), eleven of
those require an investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited
to the trust. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 16047(b) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(a);
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-340(c); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(1) (2011); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 286.3-277 (West 2011) (In Kentucky, the UPIA only applies to corporate fiduciaries. See supra note 35 and accompanying text); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2127 (2011);
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(b)(3) (In Maryland the UPIA applies to trust
companies and investment advisors and only to individual trustees who elect into the
statute. See supra notes 36 and 37 and accompanying text); MONT. CODE ANN. 72-34603(2); NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.745(2); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 112.3(b)(3)(A); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-7.
44 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 §§ 3301-3306; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203C, §§ 1-11; 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. §§ 7203-7206; WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.020.
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“risk and return?”45 Have these states rejected the risk and return concept or did the legislatures of these states consider risk and return as an
integral part of investing with an overall investment strategy? Since a
definitive answer cannot be given,46 it can only be stated that at a minimum, forty-six states and the District of Columbia have clearly adopted
the risk and return concept of the UPIA.
C. Categorical Investment Restrictions Abrogated
Under the legal lists in place in many states for decades, categorical
exclusions applied, such as prohibitions on junior mortgages and new
ventures.47 Under the prudent man (person) rule, “speculative” investments exposed the trustee to liability.48 The UPIA disavows the emphasis in traditional law on avoiding “speculative” or “risky” investments.49
UPIA § 2(e) provides: “[a] trustee may invest in any kind of property or
type of investment consistent with the standards of this [Act].” Fortyseven states and the District of Columbia have enacted a provision iden45 Delaware enacted its modern investment statute prior to the Uniform Commissioners adopting the UPIA. Thus, it did not have a model statute to examine. The absence of any reference to “risk and return” in this state does not mean the state deleted
the phrase. However, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Washington had the UPIA as a
guide but did not include the phrase.
46 There has not been any case law development in these four states to provide
insight as to whether the deletion of the phrase “risk and return” was meant to impact
the manner in which trust assets were invested.
47 FRANK C. MCKINNEY, TRUST INVESTMENT xii-xix, 33-44 (2d ed. 1927). See Leslie
Joyner Bobo, Non-traditional Investments of Fiduciaries: Reexamining the Prudent Investor Rule, 33 EMORY L.J. 1067, 1073-74 (1984).
48 In the leading case of Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 469 (Mass. 1830),
which establishes the prudent man rule, the court stated that a trustee must “observe how
men of prudence . . . manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard
to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as
the probable safety of the capital to be invested.” Jeffrey N. Gordon notes in The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, “[s]peculative stocks seems to
refer to all companies except those with regular earnings and paying regular dividends
which may reasonably be expected to continue.” 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 61 (1987). Harvey E. Bines, in Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement
of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 726 (1976), notes that the difficulty with the
term “speculation” is the “imprecision of the term.” For additional discussion on speculative stocks see John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of
Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 649 (1996); Michael T. Johnson, Speculating on the
Efficacy of “Speculation”: An Analysis of the Prudent Person’s Slipperiest Term of Art in
Light of Modern Portfolio Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 419, 422 (1996); Joel C. Dobris,
Speculations on the Idea of “Speculation” in Trust Investing: An Essay, 39 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 439, 441 (2004); and Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform:
How Prudent Is Modern Portfolio Investor Doctrine? 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 853-54
(2010).
49 UPIA, supra note 26, § 2(e), cmt. (Abrogating categoric restrictions).
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tical to UPIA § 2(e) or containing only slight editorial changes.50 Alabama prohibits investments of trust assets in private corporations.51
Kentucky and Maryland have not adopted a provision similar to UPIA
§ 2(e).52 Categorical investment restrictions have been statutorily eliminated in forty-seven states and the District of Columbia.
D. Diversification
Under the prudent man (person) rule that applied in most states
prior to the adoption of the UPIA, some courts concluded that there
50 Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted a provision identical
to UPIA § 2(e) or containing only slight editorial changes. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 13.36.230(e) (2012) (identical to UPIA); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-0902(E) (2012)
(identical to UPIA); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-902(e) (2011) (identical to UPIA); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-1.1-102(e) (2012) (identical to UPIA); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541b(e)
(2012) (editorial change made to UPIA referencing internal statutes); D.C. CODE § 191309.02(e) (2012) (editorial changes); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-340(e) (2011) (identical to
UPIA); HAW. REV. STAT. § 554c-2(e) (2011) (identical to UPIA); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 68-502(5) (2012) (identical to UPIA); IND. CODE § 30-4-3.5-2(e) (2011) (identical to
UPIA); IOWA CODE § 633A.4302(5) (2012) (identical to UPIA); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5824a02(e) (2011) (replaces “trustee” with term “fiduciary”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B,
§ 902(5) (2011) (identical to UPIA); MASS GEN. LAWS. § 203C(3)(e)(2011) (identical to
UPIA); MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(2)(d) (2012) (identical to UPIA); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 91-9-603(e) (2011) (identical to UPIA); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.902.5 (2011) (identical to
UPIA); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3884(e) (2011) (identical to UPIA); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 564-B:9-902(e) (2011) (identical to UPIA); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-7-603(E) (2011)
(identical to UPIA); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-902(e) (2011) (identical to UPIA); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 59-17-02(5) (2011) (identical to UPIA); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.62(E)
(2011) (identical to UPIA); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.755(5) (2012) (identical to UPIA); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 18-15-2(e) (2011) (identical to UPIA); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(c)(5)(a)
(2011) (identical to UPIA); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 117.004(e) (West 2011) (insertion
of introductory phrase); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-902(5) (LexisNexis 2011) (identical to
UPIA); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 902(e) (2012) (identical to UPIA); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-45.4(E) (2012) (identical to UPIA); W. VA. CODE § 44-6C-2(e) (2012) (identical to
UPIA); WIS. STAT. § 881.02(3)(e) (2011) (replaces “trustee” with “fiduciary”); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(e) (2011) (identical to UPIA).
Fifteen states have made more than editorial changes, but still permit every type of
investment. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 16047(e) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3302(b) (2011); FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(b) (2012); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(2)
(2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2127 (2011) (last sentence reads: “In investing within the
limitations of the foregoing standard, a trustee is authorized to retain and acquire every
kind of property.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.1503(1) (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7234-603(5) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.745(5) (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.3(c)
(West 2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(4)(A) (McKinney 2011);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.03(A) (LexisNexis 2011); 20 PA. CODE STAT. § 7203(b)
(2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-7 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-104(e) (2012);
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.020(1) (2012).
51 See infra Part II.F.
52 Query whether the legislatures in Maryland and Kentucky meant to restrict trust
investments by the non-inclusion of UPIA § 2(e).

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\37-2\ACT202.txt

unknown

Seq: 13

30-AUG-12

Fall 2011] HETEROGENEITY IN TRUST INVESTMENT LAW

12:55

329

was no mandatory duty to diversify trust investments.53 The UPIA integrated diversification into the very definition of prudent investing by
carving it out as a distinct duty.54 Diversification is a fundamental tenant of prudent investing under the UPIA.55 UPIA § 3 provides: “[a]
trustee shall diversify the investments of the trust unless the trustee reasonably determines that, because of special circumstances, the purposes
of the trust are better served without diversifying.”
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted a provision identical to UPIA § 3 or containing only slight editorial modifications.56 Delaware does not statutorily impose a duty to diversify,
53 See P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Duty of Trustee to Diversify Investments, and Liability for Failure to Do So, 24 A.L.R.3d 730 (1969) & 1992 Supp. at 78-79.
54 The Prefatory Note to the UPIA states: “The long familiar requirement that fiduciaries diversify their investments has been integrated into the definition of prudent investing.” UPIA, supra note 26, Prefatory Note.
55 Id.
56 Thirty-one states have adopted UPIA § 3 without changes or have made only
minor editorial changes. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.235 (2012) (identical to UPIA); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10903 (2012) (identical to UPIA); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-903
(2011) (identical to UPIA); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1.1-103 (2012) (identical to UPIA);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541c (2012) (identical to UPIA); D.C. CODE. § 19-1309.03
(2012) (identical to UPIA); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-503 (2012) (identical to UPIA); IND.
CODE § 30-4-3.5-3 (2011) (identical to UPIA); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a03 (2011) (replaces “trustee” with term “fiduciary” both places it appears in the statute); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 18-B, § 903 (2011) (identical to UPIA); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.1504 (2012)
(several editorial changes including replacing “trustee” with “fiduciary” both places it
appears in the statute); MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(3) (2012) (identical to UPIA); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 91-9-605 (2011) (identical to UPIA); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.903 (2011)
(identical to UPIA); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3885 (2011) (identical to UPIA); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 164.75 (2010) (identical to UPIA); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:9-903 (2011)
(identical to UPIA); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.4 (West 2011) (replaces “trustee” with
“fiduciary” both places it appears); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-7-604 (2011) (identical to
UPIA); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-903 (2011) (identical to UPIA); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5917-03 (2011) (identical to UPIA); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.03(B) (LexisNexis 2011)
(replaces “the” with “a” before the word “trust”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.63 (2011)
(identical to UPIA); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.756 (2012) (identical to UPIA); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 18-15-3 (2011) (identical to UPIA); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(D) (2011) (identical to UPIA); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 17.005 (West 2011) (identical to UPIA); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-7-903 (LexisNexis 2011) (identical to UPIA); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A,
§ 903 (2012) (identical to UPIA); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.5 (2012) (identical to UPIA);
W. VA. CODE § 44-6C-3 (2012) (identical to UPIA); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-903 (2011)
(identical to UPIA).
Seventeen states have modified UPIA § 3 to some degree but retain the duty to
diversify. See ALA. CODE § 19-3B- 903 (2012); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16048 (West 2012);
FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(c) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-341 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 554c-3 (2011); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(3) (2011); IOWA CODE § 633A.4303 (2012);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.3-277(3) (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15114(b)(4) (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203C, § 4 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN.
72-34-605 (2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(c) (McKinney 2011); 20 PA.
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however case law imposes the duty.57 Louisiana Statute § 9:2127 does
not mention diversification but the comments to the state statute provide: “Diversification usually is necessary to reduce risk.” In summary,
it appears all of the states and the District of Columbia statutorily impose a duty to diversify; however, as discussed in this subpart, several
states create exceptions for trusts existing before the enactment of the
act, several states ease the duty with respect to inception assets, and
several states carve out certain assets from the duty to diversify.
1. Effective Dates
Every state now imposes on the corporate trustee the duty to diversify. However, in Georgia and Pennsylvania the enacted statutory duty
does not apply to trusts existing on a certain date.
Georgia applies its version of the UPIA to all existing trusts regardless of when created.58 It requires that the trustee diversify investments.59 However, as to any trust which became irrevocable before
January 1, 2011, the duty to diversify does not apply
to the trust to the extent such trust instrument directs or permits the trustee to retain, invest, exchange, or reinvest assets
without regard to any duty to diversify, without the need to
diversify or create a diversity of investments, or without liability for either deprecation or failing to diversify, or contains
other similar language expressing a settlor’s intent to provide
similar discretion; or (b) absent gross neglect, with respect to
an asset that was transferred to the trustee of such trust by any
settlor or gratuitous transferor.60
The scope of this provision is unclear since a trust containing such a
provision would be deemed to waive the duty to diversify regardless of
when the trust was executed. However, the statute does change the investment standard to gross neglect as to inception assets held in trusts
that were irrevocable before January 1, 2011.61
Pennsylvania imposes upon the trustee the duty to diversify but
specifically amended UPIA § 3 by providing that the duty to diversify
does not apply to trusts which became irrevocable prior to December
CONS. STAT. § 7204 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-8 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3514-105 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.045 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 881.01(4) (2011).
57 See Merrill Lynch Trust Co., FSB v. Campbell, No. 1803-VCN, 2009 WL 2913893
(Del Ch. Sept. 2, 2009); Law v. Law, 753 A.2d 443 (Del. 2000).
58 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-1(b).
59 § 53-12-341.
60 § 53-12-341(3).
61 See further discussion of statutes modifying the standard of care infra at Part
II(B).
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25, 1999.62 The duty to diversify was not imposed upon existing trusts
because Pennsylvania had not required diversification and “retroactivity
would have required drafters of old trusts to have been clairvoyant to
have negated a non-existent duty to diversify.”63 Pennsylvania applies
its modified version of the UPIA to all trusts but carves out a separate
effective date for the duty to diversify.64
Kentucky’s modified version of the UPIA only applies to banks and
trust companies acting in a fiduciary capacity.65 The statute does not
apply to individuals who serve as trustee.
Maryland’s prudent investor statute applies to a trust company, an
investment advisor that is controlled by or under common control with a
trust company, or to any person that elects to have the statute apply.66
The statute does not apply to individuals serving as trustees unless they
elect to have the UPIA apply.67
2. Inception Assets
Under the law prior to enactment of the UPIA, most states had
statutes which softened the application of the prudent person rule for
assets received upon the commencement of the fiduciary relationship,
hereinafter “inception assets.”68 UPIA § 4 eliminates any special treatment for inception assets.69 Under the UPIA, the duty to diversify applies to all assets, including those contributed by the grantor
(hereinafter “grantor contributed assets”70) and those purchased by a
62

20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7204(b) (2011).
In re Scheidmantel, 868 A.2d 464, 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
64 Id.
65 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.3 277(1) (West 2011).
66 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
67 § 15-114(g).
68 U.S. TRUST, Fiduciary Powers, 1983 PRAC. DRAFTING, 153, 162 (Apr.1983) and
Appendix A thereto set forth the law in each state. The author uses the term “inception
assets” to refer to “grantor contributed assets” and those assets purchased by a prior
trustee.
69 U.S. TRUST, Diversification and Retention of Inception Assets, 2002 PRAC. DRAFTING, 7026, 7035 (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter Diversification and Retention]. UPIA § 4 provides, “Within a reasonable time after accepting a trusteeship or receiving trust assets, a
trustee shall review the trust assets and make and implement decisions concerning the
retention and disposition of assets, in order to bring the trust portfolio into compliance
with the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust,
and with the requirements of this [Act].”
70 The use of the term “grantor” would include any assets contributed by anyone to
the trust. Notwithstanding the duty to diversify inception assets under current law in
New York, New York Surrogates have recently stated that inception assets undergo a less
strict standard than other assets. In re Kopec, 885 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (Sur. Ct. 2009)
asserts, “[s]tocks owned by the decedent undergo a somewhat softer analysis: retention of
a portfolio owned by decedent may be prudent even where the independent purchase of
63
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prior trustee.71 The duty to diversify all of the trust assets applies in the
District of Columbia and all of the states except Alabama, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington.72
the same stocks by the fiduciary may not.” The Monroe County Surrogate cites to three
cases which predate the enactment of modern investment provisions in New York. Likewise, in In re HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. DO-0659, slip op. 52234(U), 2010 WL 5186667,
at *17 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Feb. 24, 2010), the New York Surrogate noted, “[o]ur Court of
Appeals [referencing In re Hahn, 426 N.Y.S.2d 924 (App. Div. 1983) also referenced in In
re Kopec 885 N.Y.S.2d 401, and In re Clark, 257 N.Y. 132 (1931)] in determining whether
a trustee has breached its fiduciary duty, has made a distinction between ‘the acts of
trustees in making investment of trust funds, and their acts in making, or failing to make,
prompt disposition of securities received from the hands of the creator of the trust.’” The
Surrogate cites to cases predating New York’s statutory enactment of a duty to review
initial assets. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(3)(D) (McKinney 2011) (enacted in 1994). The application of this “softer” analysis may be inconsistent with the
statute.
71 Diversification and Retention, supra note 69, at 7035. The author uses the term
“inception assets” to include grantor contributed assets and those assets purchased by the
prior trustee.
72 Arguably, Minnesota and Wisconsin could be added to this list. Minnesota has
enacted identical provisions to UPIA § 3 and § 4. MINN. STAT. §501B.151(3)-(4) (2012).
MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(8) provides,
Disposal of property. Unless the trust instrument or a court order specifically
directs otherwise, a trustee need not dispose of any property, real, personal, or
mixed, or any kind of investment, in the trust, however acquired, until the trustee determines in the exercise of a sound discretion that it is advisable to dispose of the property. Nothing in this subdivision excuses the trustee from the
duty to exercise discretion at reasonable intervals and to determine at those
intervals the advisability of retaining or disposing of property.
As noted by one commentator, “neither the text nor the position of this provision in the
Minnesota statute confines its effect to inception assets. If, however, it applies to the
trustee’s reinvestments, it is a qualification of the Act to a significant, if uncertain, degree.” Diversification and Retention, supra note 69, at 7036. The commentator opines the
quoted statute should be read in connection with MINN. STAT. § 501B.81(1) which provides, “The trustee may retain trust assets until, in the judgment of the trustee, disposition of the assets should be made, without regard to any effect retention may have on the
diversification of the assets of the trust.” This statute must be incorporated by reference
in the governing instrument to be effective. Since Minnesota has also adopted UPIA § 3,
thereby imposing upon the trustee the duty to diversify, to give effect to this provision,
arguably, §§ 501B.151(8) and 501B.81 waive the duty to diversify for only grantor-contributed assets and assets received from a prior trustee. Since § 501B.81 only applies if it
is incorporated by reference, then the grantor has waived the default duty to diversify
required in Minnesota. In essence, the statute creates alternative default provisions
which grantors can elect into. The trustee still has the duty to prudently manage the
assets and to determine that their retention effectuates the purposes of the trust. Since
the statute only applies if it is elected into, it is not a default provision and therefore the
author concludes that it falls into a class different than the other states granting default
preference to inception assets.
WIS. STAT. § 881.05(1) (2011) provides,
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Pennsylvania’s UPIA provides: “[a] fiduciary, in the exercise of reasonable care, skill and caution, may retain any asset received in kind,
even though the asset constitutes a disproportionally large share of the
portfolio.”73 Presumably, the reference to property “received in kind”
refers at a minimum to grantor contributed assets. Arguably, it would
also apply to the assets received from a prior trustee. Due to its placement in the statutory section immediately after its modified UPIA § 3, it
appears that the quoted language is a substitute for UPIA § 4, lending
support to the argument that the duty to review existing assets, including the duty to diversify, does not apply to any assets received from a
prior trustee or to any assets received by the grantor regardless of when
received. Query whether the statute was meant to only apply to grantor
contributed assets. The trustee still has the duty to prudently manage
and monitor the concentration but doesn’t have the duty to diversify
inception assets.
Similar to Pennsylvania, Washington adopted a modified version of
UPIA § 3 and did not adopt UPIA § 4. Washington law provides:
Subject to express provisions to the contrary in the trust instrument, any fiduciary may hold and retain any real or personal
property received into or acquired by the trust from any
source. Except as to trust property acquired for consideration,
a fiduciary may hold and retain any such property without
need for diversification as to kinds or amount and whether or
not the property is income producing.74
The second sentence waives the duty to diversify for those assets which
were acquired by a means other than “for consideration.” Presumably,
the focus is on whether the “fiduciary” acquired the assets for consideration rather than the grantor. Surely, the statute does not require the
trustee to determine if the grantor acquired the assets for consideraUnless the trust instrument or a court order specifically directs otherwise, a trustee shall not be required to dispose of any property, real or personal, or mixed,
in the estate or trust, however acquired, until the trustee determines in the exercise of a sound discretion that it is advisable to dispose of the same; but nothing
herein contained shall excuse the trustee from the duty to exercise discretion at
reasonable intervals and to determine at such times the advisability of retaining
or disposing of such property.
This statute seems simply to state the duty of prudence. Arguably, it simply says the
trustee need not sell an asset until it exercises sound discretion within a reasonable time.
Possibly the statute was enacted in response to a court case or there is legislative history
which puts more color around the statute. But, as written, it seems to merely state the
common law duty to act prudently in a prudent period of time.
73 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7205 (2011).
74 WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.060 (2012).
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tion.75 Presumably, the fiduciary would not have a duty to diversify
those assets that the trust received from the grantor by gift or devise.76
Since the focus is presumably on the fiduciary, an issue arises whether
the focus is on the current fiduciary or whether the statute uses the term
more broadly to also cover prior fiduciaries of the same trust. If the
term is to be interpreted more broadly, then the current trustee would
have a duty to diversify those assets received from a prior trustee if
those assets were purchased by the prior trustee but not those assets
that were not purchased. The second sentence is limited to those assets
not acquired for consideration; it only addresses diversification and nonincoming producing property. The first sentence is broader. Does the
first sentence permit retention of an inception asset even though retention no longer serves a trust purpose (e.g. the beneficiaries are no longer
using the vacation home)? Does the first sentence even permit the trustee to purchase an asset and retain it provided it is not a concentration?
The statute lacks clarity on a number of issues.
Maryland requires a trustee to review “fiduciary assets within a reasonable time after acceptance of the fiduciary appointment and make
and implement decisions concerning the retention or disposition of investments existing prior to the appointment in order to conform with
this section.”77 A later provision in the same statute provides that the
“fiduciary shall have no liability for continuing to hold fiduciary assets
existing at the time the fiduciary appointment was accepted or subsequently added pursuant to proper authority if, and as long as, the fiduciary, in the exercise of good faith and reasonable prudence, considers the
retention to be in the best interest of the beneficiaries or in the furtherance of the goals of the governing instrument.”78 The statute waives the
duty to diversify grantor contributed assets and assets received from a
prior trustee. The trustee has the duty to determine whether retention
of these assets is in the best interests of the beneficiaries and whether
the assets effectuate the purposes of the trust. Since the trustee has the
duty to sell assets that are not in the best interest of the beneficiaries or
that do not effectuate a trust purpose, it appears the statute may only
75 In Rhodehamel v. Rhodehamel, No. C07-0081Z, 2008 WL 249042, at*12 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 29, 2008), the court referenced WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.060 and held that
this statute relieved the trustee from any duty to diversify stock in Eli Lilly which was
part of the original trust corpus of the revocable trust and was not acquired for consideration. While not stating so expressly, the court focused on whether the trustee, rather than
the grantor, acquired the stock for consideration.
76 The statute would not apply to those assets the fiduciary purchased from the
grantor.
77 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15 114(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
78 § 15-114(c)(3).

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\37-2\ACT202.txt

unknown

Seq: 19

30-AUG-12

Fall 2011] HETEROGENEITY IN TRUST INVESTMENT LAW

12:55

335

waive the duty to diversify inception assets.79 Because the quoted provision does not clearly state that the duty to diversify is waived as to
inception assets and because it is not located in the same section of the
statute as the duty to diversify, there is a lack of clarity as to its exact
scope.
Alabama and Tennessee have adopted UPIA §§ 3 and 4; however,
they have modified UPIA § 3 by adding a new subsection (b) which
reads as follows in Tennessee:
In the absence of express provisions to the contrary in the governing instrument, a fiduciary may without liability continue to
hold property received into a trust at its inception or subsequently added to it or acquired pursuant to proper authority if
and as long as the fiduciary, in the exercise of good faith and
prudence, discretion and intelligence, may consider that retention is in the best interest of the trust and its beneficiaries or in
furtherance of the goals of the trustor as determined from that
instrument. . ..”80
This statute and the similar statute in Alabama do not suffer with the
same ambiguity regarding focus as the statute in Maryland does since
the inception asset provisions are located in the same section of the statute as the duty to diversify. The default provisions are meant to modify
the duty to diversify grantor contributed assets. Arguably, the statute
would also waive the duty to diversify all assets received from a prior
trustee (even those purchased by the prior trustee) since those assets
would be acquired by the trustee “pursuant to proper authority.”81 Similar to that of Maryland, the Alabama and Tennessee statutes require
79 Id. Arguably, the statute would permit retention of an asset the trustee
purchased.
80 TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(b)(1) (2012). Alabama contains a very similar
provision except Alabama’s statute does not contain the phrase “discretion and intelligence” and uses the phrase “furtherance of the purposes of the trust” rather than “furtherance of the goals of the trustor as determined from that instrument.” See ALA. CODE
§ 19-3B-903(b) (2012). Alabama specifically provides that the waiver of the duty to diversify with respect to inception assets applies to “successor-in-interest to the original
property” and “may also include, among other things, stock in the trustee if a corporation
and stock in any corporation controlling, controlled by, or under common controls with
the trustee.” Tennessee’s statute clearly modifies the duty to diversify grantor contributed assets and possibly those assets received from a prior trustee because Tennessee’s
statute provides the duty to diversify is modified by the provision of subsection (b). In
Alabama, a similar subsection (b) has been added but the duty to diversify contained in
subsection (a) is not expressly modified by it. Presumably the duty to diversify in both
states is modified by this provision.
81 It could even be argued that the quoted provision would also cover assets that the
fiduciary acquired by purchase since most trusts grant the trustee the power to purchase
assets and therefore the acquisition would be made “pursuant to proper authority.”
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the trustee to determine whether the inception assets effectuate the purposes of the trust, and, if not, then the assets must be sold.82
While Alabama, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Washington impose upon the trustee the duty to diversify, they modify that duty
with respect to inception assets.83 Trustees should bear in mind these
state modifications, including the noted ambiguities, when investing
trust assets governed by the laws of these states.
3. Specific Asset Carve Out
Certain states impose upon the trustee the duty to diversify but relieve the trustee from that duty for certain assets.
(a). Montana’s Specific Asset Carve Out
Montana imposes upon the trustee the duty to diversify but relieves
the trustee from that duty with respect to farm or ranch property,
closely held family businesses, timber interests, and interests in oil, gas,
or minerals.84 The trustee may retain those assets unless otherwise directed by a majority of the adult beneficiaries.85 The statute continues:
“[a] trustee’s exercise of discretion to retain assets of the character described in this subsection is not a breach of the trustee’s duty to diversify
investments.”86 The statute is not limited to grantor contributed assets.
Presumably, the trustee would have no duty to diversify the referenced
assets even if purchased by a prior trustee. In fact, the statute could be
read so as to permit retention of these assets even if purchased by the
current trustee.
(b). Life Insurance Carve Out
Thirteen states have carved out an exception from the duty to diversify and from the duty to invest with care, skill and caution with respect to life insurance.87 Some of the states relieve the trustee from a
TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(b)(1). However, such an interpretation would eviscerate
the duty to diversify altogether.
82 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-903(b); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(b)(1).
83 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-903(b); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(b)(4)
(LexisNexis 2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7205 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14105(b)(1); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.060 (2012).
84 MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-605(2) (2011).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-818 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10908 (2012);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d) (2011); FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(1)(e) (2012); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 36C-9-903.1 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5809.031; 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7208; S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(J) (2011); S.D.
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list of duties with respect to the life insurance policy,88 while others provide that the trustee cannot be held liable for any loss arising from the
trustee’s failure to perform certain duties.89 All but one of these thirteen states permit a trustee to acquire and retain the policy.90 Certain
states provide protection for life insurance policies on the life of the
grantor,91 the grantor’s spouse,92 and policies on their joint lives.93
Some states even provide relief for policies on the grantor’s children,94
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-17 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c) (2012); VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-45.4(G) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(g) (2011).
88 See FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(1) (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-903.1(a); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.031; S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7933(J)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-17(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1); VA.
CODE ANN. § 26-45.4(G).
89 See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-818; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10908; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7208 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10902(g).
90 See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-818 (“retain” or “purchased”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-10908 (“acquire or retain”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d) (“acquire or retain”);
FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(1) (“acquired or retained”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-903.1(a)
(“acquiring or retaining”; N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44 (“acquisition, retention, or ownership”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.031 (“acquisition, retention, or ownership”); 20
PA. CONS. STAT. § 7208 (“acquire or retain”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(J)(1) (addresses acquiring property but is silent as to retention); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-17(a)
(“acquiring, retaining, or disposing”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1) (“acquisition,
retention, or ownership”); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.4(G) (permits a trustee to hold any
life insurance policies acquired by gift or pursuant to an express permission or direction
in the governing instrument to be relieved of certain investment duties. Virginia’s statute
is not as broad as the statutes in the other states); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(g) (“acquire or retain”).
91 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-818 (may retain any policy contributed by a settlor or purchased by the trustee upon the settlor’s request); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10908;
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d); FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(2) (referencing a policy on a
person who is insured and provided funds to the trustee to acquire or pay premiums);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-903.1(a); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5809.031 (covering any person); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7208; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-7-933(J)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-17(a); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1);
VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.4(G) (permitting the trustee to be relieved from certain investment duties on any life insurance policies acquired by gift or pursuant to express permission, but not limiting the policies to certain insured individuals); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 410-902(g).
92 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10908 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d)
(2011); FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(2) (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44; 20 PA CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7208 (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(g) (2011).
93 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10908; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d); FLA.
STAT. § 736.0902(2); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-903.1(a) (2011); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7208; S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(J)(1) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-17(a)
(2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(g).
94 N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(J)(1); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1).
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grandchildren,95 or parents.96 The statutes relieve the trustee from any
duty to (1) determine whether the contract is or remains a proper investment;97 (2) investigate the financial strength or changes in the financial strength of the life insurance company;98(3) make a determination
of whether to exercise any policy option available under the contract;99
(4) make a determination of whether to diversify;100 (5) inquire about
changes in the health or financial condition of the insured or insureds
relative to such contract;101 and exercise non-forfeiture provision available under the contract.102 Certain of the states require that the trustee
notice the beneficiaries or other individuals in order to be relieved from
liability.103
A comparison of the law in these thirteen states illustrates that the
trustee will have a continuing duty with respect to certain policies and
may have certain duties with respect to all policies. For example, only
six states relieve a trustee from investment duties with respect to life
95

N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44; TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44; S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(J)(1); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1).
97 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10908 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d)(1)
(2011); FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(1)(b) (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-903.1(a)(1); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.031(A)(1); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7208 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(J)(1)(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-17(a)(1);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1)(A); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.4(G)(i) (2012); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(G)(i) (2011).
98 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10908; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d)(2); FLA.
STAT. § 736.0902(1)(c); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.031(A)(4); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 7208; S.D. Codified Laws § 55-5-17(a)(2) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14105(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(G)(ii).
99 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d)(3); FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(1)(d); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 36C-9-903.1(a)(iii) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44 (2011); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5809.01(A)(3); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(J)(1)(b) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 55-5-17(a)(3); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1)(C); VA. CODE ANN. § 2645.4(G)(iii); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(g)(iii).
100 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-818 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10908; DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d)(4); FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(1)(e); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9903.1(A)(iii) (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-44; OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5809.01(A)(2); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7208; S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(J)(1)(C); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-17(4); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(c)(1)(B); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-45.4(G)(ii); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(g)(iv).
101 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d)(5) (2011); FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(1)(f); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-17(5); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.01(A)(5); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-10-902(g)(v).
102 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10908 (2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7208 (2011).
Arguably, this duty is encompassed in the duty to determine policy options.
103 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(d) (requires notice to the insured individuals);
FLA. STAT. § 736.0902(5)(b) (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-903.1(b); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 55-5-17(b) (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-902(g) (2011) (requires notice to the
insured individual).
96
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insurance policies on the grantor’s spouse.104 Six states expressly relieve
a trustee from any duty to investigate the financial strength or changes
in the financial strength of the life insurance company.105 Can it be inferred that the trustees in the six other states still have this duty since it
is not expressly listed? A careful and detailed examination of the applicable state statutes is a necessity. Few broad principles can be applied
to the manner in which states have carved out an exception for life
insurance.
(c). Fiduciary Owning Its Own Shares and Affiliated
Investments106
Federal regulations prohibit a national bank from retaining or acquiring its own shares or shares in its affiliates, unless authorized by
applicable law.107 Likewise, the duty of loyalty would prohibit a trustee
from holding its own securities in a fiduciary account.108 Unless state
law permits a corporate fiduciary to retain or acquire its own shares, the
corporate trustee would be obligated to sell any stock held by the trust
in the fiduciary. Alabama, Delaware, Maryland, Tennessee and Washington have modified the UPIA to specifically permit a trustee to retain
its own stock and that of its affiliate in a fiduciary account if contributed
to the trust by the grantor, in other words, grantor contributed assets.109
These five states only allow retention of the stock contributed by the
grantor. They do not permit the trustee’s acquisition of its stock. In
Alabama, Tennessee and Washington, the applicable statute would allow retention even if the shares represent a concentration.110 In Dela-

104

See supra note 92.
See supra note 98.
106 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-261(f) (2011), 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5.2 (2011), KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-24a18(b) (2011), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(c)(5)(b) (2011) have
inserted into their modified UPIA provisions which permit a corporate fiduciary to invest
in an investment company or investment fiduciary funds even though the bank or trust
company provides services to the investment company or investment fiduciary funds.
These statutes do not authorize the corporate trustee to retain or acquire its own shares
or that of its affiliate. These statutes differ from those discussed in the text of this
subpart.
107 107 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(a) (2012).
108 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802 (2005).
109 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-903 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3305 (2011); MD.
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(4) (LexisNexis 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 3514-105(b)(1) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.060 (2012).
110 See supra Part I(D)(2).
105
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ware and Maryland the statutes merely waive the duty of loyalty, but do
not waive the duty of diversification.111
E. Delegation
The UPIA’s fifth fundamental alteration to prudent investing permits a trustee to delegate investment functions.112 Under former law,
the trustee was under a duty not to delegate to others acts which the
trustee could reasonably be required personally to perform.113 UPIA
§ 9(a) permits a trustee to “delegate investment and management functions that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate
under the circumstances.” UTC § 807(a) provides, “[a] trustee may
delegate duties and powers that a prudent trustee of comparable skills
could properly delegate under the circumstances. The trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.” Forty-seven states and the
District of Columbia permit delegation of investment functions, some
incorporate UPIA § 9 but add modifications, others incorporate UTC
§ 807(a) but add modifications, and others create their own delegation
provisions.114
111 Delaware’s statute does not statutorily impose a duty to diversify but court cases
have imposed the duty. See supra note 57. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15114(b)(4) imposes a duty to diversify.
112 UPIA, supra note 26, § 9.
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 171 (1959).
114 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-807 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.270(a) (2012); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14–10807 (2012); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16052 (West 2012); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-1.1-109 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT § 45a-541i (2012); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 3322 (2011); D.C. CODE § 19-1308.07 (2012); FLA. STAT. § 518.112(1)-(2)(a) (2012);
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-345 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 554c-9 (2011); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 68-509 (2012); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5.1(b) (2011); IND. CODE § 30-4-3.5-9
(2011); IOWA CODE § 633A.4206 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a09 (2011); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2087 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 807 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
203C, § 10 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.1510 (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-617
(2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.909 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-609 (2011); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-3888 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.770 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 564-B:8-807 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.10 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 457-601 (2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(4)(C) (McKinney 2011);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-807 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-07 (2011); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5809.06 (LexisNexis 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.69 (2011); OR. REV.
STAT. § 130.680 (2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7206 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-15-9
(2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-807 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-16 (2011); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 35-14-111 (2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 807 (2012); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-45.10 (2012); W. VA. CODE § 44-6C-9 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 881.01(10) (2011); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 4-10-909 (2011). Maryland, Minnesota and Utah did not adopt UPIA § 9
or UTC § 807(a).
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1. Uniform Trust Code Differences
Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) § 807(a) is broader in scope than
UPIA § 9(a). The latter addresses delegating “investment and management functions” while the former addresses delegating “duties and powers.” The broader standard in the UTC encompasses the narrower
standard in the UPIA. The UTC makes several other minor editorial
changes to UPIA § 9 but it’s unlikely these changes would impact an
interpretation of the two statutes. Thus, a state’s adoption of UTC § 807
is an adoption of UPIA § 9.
2. Co-Trustee
Six states specifically provide that a co-trustee may delegate investment and management functions to another co-trustee with greater investment skills.115 Presumably, this ability is implied in UPIA § 9(a)
since a trustee is permitted to delegate and there is no provision restricting a co-trustee from being the designee.
3. Agent’s Qualifications
UPIA § 9 requires the trustee to exercise reasonable care, skill, and
caution in selecting an agent. The UPIA does not provide any additional color as to the agent’s qualifications. Missouri and New York require the trustee to take “into account the nature and the value of the
assets subject to such delegation and the expertise” of the agent.116 Illinois provides that the trustee “must conduct an inquiry into the experience, performance history, professional licensing or registration, if any,
and financial stability.”117 Kansas requires the trustee to “conduct an
inquiry into the experience, performance history, errors and omissions
coverage, professional licensing or registration, and financial stability of
the investment agent.”118 New Jersey requires the trustee to have
“sound financial standing.”119 Query whether these statutory provisions
are encompassed in a review performed with skill, caution and care.
However, since these states require these items to be examined, a wise
trustee will document that these items have been separately reviewed.
115 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14–10907(E); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, § 3322(b); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 91-9-617(e); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B-20-11.10(e); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5807(A)(1); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7206(e). The statutory modifications in Arizona,
Mississippi and Pennsylvania are nearly identical. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN
§ 14–10907(E); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, § 3322(b); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-617(e).
116 MO. REV. STAT. § 469.909; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(4)(C).
117 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5.1(b)(2).
118 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a09(a)(2).
119 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.10(a)(1) (West 2011).
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4. Terms of the Delegation
UPIA § 9(a)(2) requires the trustee to establish “the scope and
terms of the delegation, consistent with the purposes and terms of the
trust.” UTC § 807(a)(2) is identical to UPIA § 9(a)(2). Florida,120 Illinois,121 Kansas122 and Pennsylvania123 require the trustee to establish
the “specific” terms of the delegation.124 Arguably, a delegation of all
investment duties may not be specific enough.
5. Agent’s Standard of Care
UPIA § 9(b) requires an agent while performing a delegated function to exercise “reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.” UTC 807(b) is identical. The agent’s duty is to comply with the
terms of the delegation. Six states have modified UPIA § 9(b) to require the agent not only to comply with the terms of the delegation but
also to exercise the delegated function according to a certain standard.125 Four states specifically provide that the agent is held to the
same standards as the trustee.126
6. Review of Agent’s Performance
UPIA § 9(a)(3) requires the trustee to periodically review “the
agent’s actions in order to monitor the agent’s performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.” UTC § 807(a)(3) is identical to
UPIA § 9(a)(3). Six states have modified the statute by requiring the
trustee to monitor the agent’s “overall” performance.127 Of these six
states, three of them require that the trustee monitor the “overall” per120

FLA. STAT. § 518.112(1) (2012).
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5.1(b)(1) (2011).
122 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a09(a)(1) (2011).
123 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7206(b) (2011).
124 The origin of the word “specific” is likely comment j to the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS which provides: “[t]he trustee must exercise care, skill, and caution in
establishing the scope and specific terms of any delegation, and must keep reasonably
informed in order to monitor the execution of investment decisions or plans.” Florida’s
UPIA § 4 is identical to § 90(b) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS.
125 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42(a)-541i(b) (2012) (“reasonable care, skill and caution”); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3.5-9(b) (2011) (“reasonable care”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2087(D)(2) (2011) (“care and skill”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 91-9-617(b) (2011) (“reasonable care, skill and caution”); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(c)(2) (McKinney 2011) (“reasonable care, skill and caution”); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7206(c) (2011)
(“reasonable care, skill and caution”).
126 FLA. STAT. § 518.112 (2012); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5.1(b)(4)-(5) (2011); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-24a09(b)-(c); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.10(b) (West 2011).
127 CAL. PROB. CODE § 16052 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. § 518.112(1); 760 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/5.1(b)(1); IOWA CODE § 633A.4206 (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a09(a)(1)
(2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-609(1)(c) (2011).
121
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formance of the “specific” terms of the delegation.128 Georgia, Iowa
and Louisiana require the trustee not only to monitor but also to take
action to remedy any breach by the agent.129 Nevada replaces the word
“monitor” with “verify.”130 Query whether any of these state modifications impact an interpretation of UPIA § 9(a)(3).
7. Notice
The UPIA and the UTC do not require that the trustee notify the
beneficiaries when investment functions are delegated. Likewise, South
Dakota’s statute does not require notice; however, it provides that
the trustee may seek the prior approval for the delegation from
all known beneficiaries of the trust or from the court. If such
approval is given in writing by all known beneficiaries or by the
court, the trustee is not liable for the acts of the person to
whom the authority is delegated except in the cases of gross
misconduct or gross negligence by the delegating trustee in the
selection or monitoring of the agent.131
New Jersey requires the trustee to “provide reasonable advance written
notice on each occasion upon which the fiduciary intends to delegate
investment and management functions pursuant to [§ 3B:20-11.10(f)],
including the identity of the agent.”132
8. Exoneration
The official comments to the UPIA § 9 provide:
The trustee’s duties of care, skill, and caution in framing the
terms of the delegation [see UPIA § 9(a)(2) which requires the
trustee to establish the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the purposes and terms of the trust] should protect
the beneficiary against overbroad delegation. For example, a
trustee could not prudently agree to an investment management agreement containing an exculpation clause that leaves
the trust without recourse against reckless mismanagement.
128 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.112; 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5.1(b)(1); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 58-24a09(a)(1); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7207(b) (2011).
129 IOWA CODE § 633A.4206(2)(d); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2087(D)(1) (2011); GA.
CODE ANN. § 53-12-345 (2011). But see UPIA, supra note 26, § 9(a)(3).
130 NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.770(1)(c) (2010).
131 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-16 (2011).
132 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.10(f) (West 2011). New Jersey imposes upon the trustee the duty to control the overall costs of the delegation, “including making a reduction
in the amount of corpus commissions otherwise allowable to the fiduciary with respect to
the trust assets for which investment responsibility has been delegated. . ..” N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:20-11.8.

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\37-2\ACT202.txt

344

unknown

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

Seq: 28

30-AUG-12

12:55

[Vol. 37:317

Leaving one’s beneficiaries remediless against willful wrongdoing is inconsistent with the duty to use care and caution in formulating the terms of the delegation. This sense that it is
imprudent to expose beneficiaries to broad exculpation clauses
underlies both federal and state legislation restricting exculpation clauses. . ..
Connecticut, Louisiana and New York have amended UPIA § 9 to provide that an attempted exoneration of an agent from liability for failure
to exercise reasonable care is contrary to public policy.133
9. Changes to Jurisdictional Provisions
UPIA § 9(d) provides: “[b]y accepting the delegation of a trust
function from the trustee of a trust that is subject to the law of this State,
an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.” UTC
§ 807(d) is for the most part identical.134 Five states have amended
UPIA § 9(d) by providing that the agent submits to the jurisdiction even
if the delegation agreement provides otherwise.135 Arizona136 Mississippi137 and Pennsylvania138 provide that an investment in a mutual
fund is not a delegation of investment function and neither the mutual
fund nor its advisor is an investment agent.
F. Summary
All five fundamental alterations to the former criteria for investing
have been adopted by at least forty-four states and the District of Columbia in a form identical or nearly identical to the UPIA or its counterpart in the UTC. Three of these fundamental provisions have been
adopted by forty-eight states and the District of Columbia.139 Broadly,
it can be said that trustees throughout the United States must invest in
accordance with the five fundamental principles expressed in the UPIA;
however, as set forth in this Part and in the following Part of this article,
there is rich diversity among the states on numerous provisions.
133 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541i(b) (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2087(D)(2)
(2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(c)(2) (McKinney 2011).
134 UTC § 807(d) is nearly identical except for the following two changes: (1) the
article “a” replaces the article “the” before the word “delegation;” and (2) the phrase “a
trust function” is replaced with “powers or duties.”
135 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-345(d) (2011) (amends UPIA § 9(d) by also providing
that the agent waives the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 3B:20-11.10(d); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(c)(2); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7206(d) (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-100-909(d) (2011).
136 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10907(f) (2012).
137 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 91-9-617(f) (2011).
138 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7206(f) (2011).
139 See supra Parts I(A), (C), (D).
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UPIA

In addition to those modifications set forth in Part I, the forty-one
states and the District of Columbia that have enacted the UPIA have
modified other sections.140
A. Express Requirement
The UPIA is a default rule.141 UPIA § 1(b) provides the prudent
investor rule “may be expanded, restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust.” UTC § 103(18) defines the phrase
“terms of a trust” to include the written trust agreement and oral expressions to the extent state law allows oral expressions as evidence to
interpret the trust agreement.142 The grantor’s oral expressions can
serve to guide the trustee if such expressions are admissible to interpret
the trust agreement under applicable law.143 For those states that have
enacted the UTC without modifying § 103(18), the provisions of the
UPIA can be modified by oral expressions if they meet the evidentiary
requirements of the governing law. Forty-seven states and the District

140

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
UPIA, supra note 26, § 1(b). As stated in the comments to UPIA § 1, “[a]lmost
all of the rules of trust law are default rules, that is, rules that the settlor may alter or
abrogate. UPIA § 1(b) carries forward this traditional attribute of trust law.” Like most
statutory trust provisions, the duty to diversify is a default provision. See 1 AUSTIN W.
SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.2.4, at 42-49 (5th ed. 2007); see also
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L. J. 625, 650
(1995). UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b) (2005) provides: “[t]he terms of a trust prevail over
any provision of this [Code] except. . ..[the statute continues with 14 provisions that cannot be overridden by the trust].”
142 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. b states:
141

The phrase “terms of the trust” is broadly defined to include intentions of the
settlor manifested in any way that admits of proof in a judicial proceeding. . .
Thus, the trust terms, expressed and implied, may be derived from written or
spoken words, circumstances surrounding the establishment of the trust, and
sometimes statutory language that is automatically imported into trusts or by
which some trusts are established.
See also 1 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 141, § 2.2.4 for a discussion of what is meant by “the
terms of the trust.” Comments to UPIA § 2 provide, “[w]hen there is a written trust
instrument, modern authority strongly favors allowing evidence extrinsic to the instrument to be consulted for the purposes of ascertaining the settlor’s intent.” UPIA, supra
note 26, § 2, cmt. (Matters of Proof).
143 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(18) cmt. (2005).
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of Columbia states have enacted UPIA § 1(b).144 California,145 Florida,146 Illinois,147 Missouri,148 Montana,149New Jersey,150 New York,151
144 The following twenty-six states and the District of Columbia states have enacted
UPIA § 1(b) with no or only slight modifications: ALA. CODE § 19-3B-901(b) (2012) (replaces “provisions” with the word “terms” both places it appears); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14 - 10901(B)-(C) (2012) (several editorial changes); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73901(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1.1-101(b) (2012) (identical to
UPIA); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541a(b) (2012) (several editorial changes); D.C. CODE
§ 19-1309.01(b) (2012) (several editorial changes); HAW. REV. STAT. § 554c-1(b) (2011)
(identical to UPIA); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-501(2) (2012) (identical to UPIA); IND.
CODE § 30-4-3.5-1(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); KANSAS STAT. ANN. § 58 - 24a01(b)
(2000) (replaces “trustee” with the term “fiduciary” both places it appears); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 700.1502(2) (2012) (several editorial changes); MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(b) (2012)
(identical to UPIA); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-601(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 30-3883(b) (2011) (identical to UPIA); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-7-602(B)
(2011) (identical to UPIA); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-17-01(2) (2011)(identical to UPIA);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.61(B) (2011) (identical to UPIA); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.750(2)
(2012) (several editorial changes); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-15-1(b) (2011) (identical to
UPIA); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(B)(2) (2011) (several editorial changes); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 35-14-103(b) (2012) (removed the word “reasonable”); TEXAS PROP. CODE
ANN. § 17.003(b) (West 2011) (identical to UPIA); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-901(2) (LexisNexis 2011) (several editorial changes); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 901(b) (2012) (identical to UPIA); W. VA. CODE § 44-6C-1(B) (2012) (identical to UPIA); WIS. STAT.
§ 881.01(2)(b) (2011) (several editorial changes); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-901(b) (2011)
(identical to UPIA).
The following twenty-one states have modified or significantly modified the provision but retain the general principle that the provisions of the trust may modify the prudent investor rule: ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.225(b) (2012); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16046(b)
(West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. § 3303(a) (2011); FLA. STAT. § 518.11(2) (2012); 760 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/5(b) (2011); IOWA CODE § 633A.4201(2) (2012); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B,
§ 901(2) (2011); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(d) (LexisNexis 2012); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 203C, § 2(b) (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.901.2 (2011); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-34-602(2) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.710 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 564-B:9-901(b) (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.2(b) (West 2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 11-2.3(b)(1) (McKinney 2011) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-901(B)
(2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.01(C) (LexisNexis 2011); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7202(b) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.3(B) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.010
(2012).
Georgia, Kentucky and Louisiana have not enacted a provision similar to UPIA
§ 1(b). While Georgia’s statute does not incorporate UPIA § 1(b), GA. CODE ANN. § 5312-79(a) (2011) provides the provisions of the Revised Georgia Trust Code, which contains provisions identical and similar to the UPIA, may be varied by the trust instrument.
See 2010 Ga. Laws 506, enacting the Revised Georgia Trust Code of 2010, effective Jan. 1,
2011, § 1.
145 CAL. PROB. CODE § 16046(b).
146 FLA. STAT. § 518.11(2).
147 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(b).
148 MO. REV. STAT. § 469.901.2.
149 MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-602(2).
150 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.2(b) (West 2011).
151 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(a) (McKinney 2011).
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and Washington152 modify UPIA § 1(b) by requiring that changes to the
provisions of the UPIA be made by “express provisions in the trust instrument.”153 By requiring an express provision in the trust instrument,
these eight states prohibit oral modifications and implied modifications
to the UPIA. Florida’s statute continues that “an express provision
need not refer specifically to” the statute.154
Virginia’s modification to UPIA § 1(b) is more expansive. Its statute provides:
The prudent investor rule, a default rule, may be expanded,
restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered by the provisions of
a trust. A general authorization in a controlling document authorizing a trustee to invest in such assets as the trustee, in his
sole discretion, may deem best, or other language purporting
to expand the trustees investment powers, shall not be construed to waive the rule of subsection A unless the controlling
document expressly manifests an intention that it be waived (i)
by reference to “prudent man” or “prudent investor” rule, (ii)
by reference to power of the trustee to make “speculative” investments, (iii) by an express authorization to acquire or retain
a specific asset or type of asset such as a closely held business,
or (iv) by other language synonymous with (i), (ii) or (iii).”155
Similar to the eight states’ statutes referenced in the preceding paragraph, Virginia’s statute requires an express override; however, unlike
the other states’ statutes, Virginia’s statute spells out what specificity is
required and what language is not sufficient to override the UPIA.
As set forth supra in subpart I(D)(2), Alabama permits a trustee to
retain inception assets notwithstanding the lack of diversity “in the absence of an express provision to the contrary in the terms of the
trust.”156 Thus, the trustee is not required to diversify inception assets
unless the trust contains an express provision requiring diversification.
As to all other assets, diversification is required unless the terms of the
trust expand, restrict, eliminate or otherwise alter the terms; however,
152

WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.040 (2012).
FLA. STAT. § 518.11(2) (2012) and N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(a)
refer to the “governing instrument” rather than the “trust instrument.” OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5809.01(C) (LexisNexis 2011) provides, “[t]he Ohio Uniform Prudent Investor
Act may be expanded, restricted, eliminated, or otherwise altered, without express reference by the instrument creating a trust to the Ohio Uniform Prudent Investor Act or any
section of the Revised Code that is part of that act.” Ohio’s statute provides that an
expressed override can occur without reference to the UPIA. It does not prohibit oral or
implied modifications.
154 FLA. STAT. § 518.11(2).
155 VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.3(B) (2012).
156 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-903 (2012).
153
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those terms are not required to be made expressly by the trust
instrument.157
Delaware’s version of the UPIA provides the “governing instrument may expand, restrict, eliminate, or otherwise vary the rights and
interests of beneficiaries,” including the circumstances, if any, in which
the fiduciary must diversify investments.158 The succeeding section of
the statute provides “any such instrument directing the retention of any
such property [referencing inception assets] as a trust investment shall
be deemed to waive any duty of diversification otherwise applicable to
the fiduciary with respect to such property. . . .”159 Generally, a standard retention clause is insufficient to waive the duty to diversify.160 It’s
unclear whether the Delaware statute was intended to override this general rule. The statute does not specify whether the retention provision
must specifically refer to the inception asset by name or whether a general description of the class of property (e.g., “real estate”) is sufficient.
The statute is limited to inception assets.
New Hampshire has enacted the first sentence of UPIA § 1(a) but
has added the phrase: “except as provided in RSA 564-B;1-105(b)(2)
and (3).”161 Said sections, from UTC § 105(b)(2) and (3), provide,
the terms of a trust prevail over any provisions of this chapter
except . . .(2) the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the
interests of the beneficiaries; (3) the requirement that a trust
and its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries, and that the
trust have a purpose that is lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve.162
Since New Hampshire’s UPIA is contained in its Uniform Trust Code,
it’s unclear what was intended by inserting the reference to UPIA
§ 105(b)(2) and (3) in UPIA § 1(a). On the one hand, the addition is
redundant. On the other hand, its insertion may be more significant.
157

ALA. CODE § 19-3B-901(b).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3303(a) (2011).
159 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3304.
160 Trent S. Kiziah, The Trustee’s Duty to Diversify: An Examination of the Developing Case Law, 36 ACTEC L.J. 357, 381 (2010). See M.L. Cross, Annotation, Construction
and Effect of Instrument Authorizing or Directing Trustee or Executor to Retain Investments Received Under Such Instrument, 47 A.L.R.2d 187 (1956). RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 92 cmt. d(2) (2003) provides,
[a] general authorization in an applicable statute or in the terms of the trust to
retain investments received as a part of a trust estate does not ordinarily abrogate the trustee’s duty with respect to diversification or the trustee’s general
duty to act with prudence in investment matters.
161 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:9-901(b) (2011).
162 § 564-B:1-105(b)(2)-(3).
158
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The statute clearly indicates that any modifications to the UPIA are
subject to the overriding principle that the modifications must be in the
interests of the beneficiaries. The reporter for the UPIA predicts that in
the future the benefit-the-beneficiaries preemption doctrine set forth in
UTC § 105(b)(3) will restrain the grantor from imposing unreasonable
restraints on diversification such as directing the retention of a concentration in a publicly held company.163 Does New Hampshire’s insertion
of UTC § 105(b)(3) indicate that modifications provisions will be carefully scrutinized to insure they benefit the beneficiaries?
B. Modification of Standard of Care
The second sentence of UPIA § 1(b) provides, “A trustee is not
liable to a beneficiary to the extent that the trustee acted in reasonable
reliance on the provisions of the trust.” As set forth in the preceding
subpart, numerous states have modified UPIA § 1(b) by providing that
modifications to the UPIA must be made expressly. Many of the same
states have modified the second sentence of UPIA § 1(b) to provide
that a trustee is not liable to a beneficiary for the trustee’s “good faith
reliance” on express provisions.164 In Tennessee and Maryland, the fiduciary may retain inception assets as long as the fiduciary “in the exercise of good faith and reasonable prudence” considers the retention to
be in the best interest of the beneficiaries.165 These statutes provide
greater protection to a trustee who relies on an express provision. Iowa
and Washington make it clear that the trust may be modified but in no

163 John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1105, 1110, 1112-15 (2004).
164 CAL. PROB. CODE § 16046(b) (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(e)
(2011); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(b) (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.901.2 (2011); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 72-34-602(2) (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:9-901(b); VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-45.3(B) (2012).
165 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2012) permits retention of inception assets “as long as, the fiduciary, in the exercise of good faith and reasonable prudence, considers the retention to be in the best interests of the beneficiaries or in
furtherance of the goals of the governing instrument.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-105(b)
(2012) permits retention as long as the fiduciary, in the exercise of good faith and reasonable prudence, discretion and intelligence, may consider that retention is in the best interest of the trust and its beneficiaries or is in furtherance of the goals of the trustor as
determined from that instrument.
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event can a trust authorize a trustee to act in bad faith166 or relieve the
trustee from the duty to act in good faith and with honest judgment.167
Illinois provides,
[t]he trustee’s investment decisions and actions are to be
judged in terms of the trustee’s reasonable business judgment
regarding the anticipated effect on the trust portfolio as a
whole under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time
of the decision or action. . ..168
Florida’s statute reads the same except for the use of the term “fiduciary’s” rather than “trustee’s.”169 Maryland’s statute is similar in that it
also provides the fiduciary may exercise reasonable business judgment.170 Illinois’ statute was modeled on the Proposed Final Draft of
the Restatement of Trusts 3d: Prudent Investor Rule.171 Florida’s and
Maryland’s statutes are nearly identical to the Illinois statute. Is it possible that the business judgment test was intentionally removed from the
Restatement’s final draft because it was deemed advisable to have a
trust standard rather than a business judgment standard in place? The
standard is different.172 Query whether the business judgment standard
is appropriate in a trust context.173
C. Reviewing Compliance
UPIA § 8 provides, “Compliance with the prudent investor rule is
determined in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time of
a trustee’s decision or action and not by hindsight.” The Comments to
§ 8 provides:
166

IOWA CODE § 633A.4201(2) (2012) provides,
The terms of the trust may expand, restrict, eliminate, or otherwise alter the
duties prescribed by this trust code, and the trustee may reasonably rely on
those terms, but nothing in this trust code authorizes a trustee to act in bad faith
or in disregard of the purposes of the trust or in the interest of the beneficiaries.
167 WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010 (2012) provides, “In no event may a trustee be
relieved of the duty to act in good faith and with honest judgment.”
168 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5 (a)(2).
169 FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(b) (2012).
170 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2012).
171 See UPIA, supra note 26, Prefatory Note.
172 See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D. D.C. 1974).
173 Jeffrey N. Gordon argues “[s]ince the Business Judgment Rule takes no account
of risk taking (except in the limited sense that the risk must be rational in light of the
expected return), it is not an appropriate trust law standard.” Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52, 96
(1987).
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This section derives from the 1991 Illinois act, 760 ILCS 5/
5(a)(2)(1992), which draws upon Restatement of Trusts 3d:
Prudent Investor Rule § 227, comment b, at 11 (1992). Trustees are not insurers. Not every investment or management decision will turn out in the light of hindsight to have been
successful. Hindsight is not the relevant standard. In the language of law and economics, the standard is ex ante, not ex
post.
Thirty-one states have enacted a provision identical to UPIA § 8 or
made slight editorial modifications.174 Four states have not enacted this
provision or a provision similar to it.175 The remaining fifteen states and
the District of Columbia have modified the section to some degree.176
Of these fifteen states, eight states have enacted a provision identical to
UPIA § 8, but delete the phrase “and not by hindsight.”177 Florida, Illi174 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.265 (2012) (identical to UPIA); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-10905 (2012) (identical to UPIA); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-905 (2011) (identical to
UPIA); CAL. PROB. CODE § 16051 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1.1-108 (2012)
(identical to UPIA); HAW. REV. STAT. § 554c-8 (2011) (identical to UPIA); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 68-508 (2012) (identical to UPIA); IND. CODE § 30-4-3.5-8 (2011) (identical to
UPIA); IOWA CODE § 633A.4308 (2012) (identical to UPIA); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5824a08 (2011) (replaces “trustee” with term “fiduciary”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 905
(2011) (identical to UPIA; even though the title to the section is mislabeled as “Investment Costs”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-615 (2011) (identical to UPIA); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-34-608 (2011) (identical to UPIA); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3887 (2011) (identical to UPIA); NEV. REV. STAT. § 164.765 (2010) (identical to UPIA); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 564-B:9-905 (2011) (identical to UPIA); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-7-609 (2011)
(identical to UPIA); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-905 (2011) (identical to UPIA); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 59-17-05 (2011) (identical to UPIA); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.68 (2011)
(identical to UPIA); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.770 (2012) (identical to UPIA); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 18-15-8 (2011) (identical to UPIA); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(G) (2011) (identical to UPIA); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-110 (2012) (identical to UPIA); TEX. PROP.
CODE ANN. § 117.010 (West 2011) (identical to UPIA); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 905
(2012) (identical to UPIA); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.9 (2012) (identical to UPIA); W. VA.
CODE § 44-6C-8 (2012) (identical to UPIA); WIS. STAT. § 881.01(9) (2011) (replaces
“trustee” with “fiduciary”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-908 (2011) (insertion of “under this
article” after “rule”).
175 Kentucky, Louisiana, South Dakota and Washington have not enacted UPIA § 8
or a similar provision.
176 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-905 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541h (2012); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(c) (2011); D.C. CODE § 19-1309.05 (2012); FLA. STAT.
§ 518.11(1)(b) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-343 (2011); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
5(a)(2) (2011); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2012); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 203C, § 9 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.1509 (2012); MINN. STAT.
§ 501B.151(6) (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.908 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.9
(West 2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(1) (McKinney 2011); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 7213 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-905 (LexisNexis 2011).
177 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541h, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(c), FLA. STAT.
§ 518.11(1)(b), 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(2), MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-
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nois, and Maryland provide that the trustee’s investment decisions and
actions are to be judged in terms of the trustee’s reasonable business
judgment.178 Nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted
UPIA § 8 but have inserted at the beginning or end thereof a sentence
similar to the following which has been added in Connecticut: “The prudent investor rule expresses a standard of conduct, not outcome.”179
Query whether any of these changes to § 8 materially impact its effect.
Arguably, the legislatures modified the UPIA in order to effectuate a
change. Case law has yet to provide any insight on these issues.
D. List of Factors
UPIA § 2(c) provides:
Among circumstances that a trustee shall consider in investing
and managing trust assets are such of the following as are relevant to the trust or its beneficiaries:
(1) general economic conditions;
(2) the possible effect of inflation or deflation;
(3) the expected tax consequences of investment decisions or strategies;
(4) the role that each investment or course of action plays
within the overall trust portfolio, which may include financial assets, interests in closely held enterprises, tangible
personal property, and real property;
(5) the expected total return from income and the appreciation of capital;
(6) other resources of the beneficiaries;
(7) needs for liquidity, regularity of income, and preservation or appreciation of capital;
(8) an asset’s special relationship or special value, if any,
to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the
beneficiaries.
114(c)(2), MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203C § 9, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.9, N.Y. EST. POW& TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(1).
178 FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(b); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(2); MD. CODE ANN., EST.
& TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(2). See supra Part II(B) for further discussion of the business judgment standard.
179 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-905; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541h; D.C. CODE § 19-1309.05;
FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(b); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.1509; MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(6);
MO. REV. STAT. § 469.908; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.9; N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 11-2.3(b)(1); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7213. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-905 adds an
additional sentence to UPIA § 8 which provides, “This section does not require a specific
outcome in investing.”
ERS
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The trustee must consider those factors that are relevant. The list is
nonexclusive.180 Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have
enacted UPIA § 2(c), but most of the states have modified it in part.181
Eight states have replaced “shall consider” with “may consider” in the
introductory phrase.182 This change is more than editorial because these
same states did not replace “shall” with “may” in UPIA §§ 2(d), 3, 4, 5
and 6. These eight states have relaxed the investment standard by shifting a mandatory “shall” to a permissive “may.” If one of the eight factors listed is not relevant, then this modification is insignificant. But if
the factor is relevant, then in a majority of the states, the trustee must
consider the factor when investing, but in these eight states the trustee
may, but need not, consider the factor. This fairly innocuous change of
words can significantly impact the investment process. Query whether
the duty to invest and manage as a prudent investor required by UPIA
§ 2(a) requires the trustee to consider these factors. If so, the permissive standard set forth in these eight states may mislead trustees. A
careful trustee would consider the eight listed factors even though in
these eight states the statute presumably does not mandate that the trustee do so.
Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have enacted UPIA
§ 2(c)(2), but five of these states have deleted the reference to
“deflation.”183
UPIA § 2(c)(6) requires the trustee to consider the “other resources of the beneficiaries.” It has been enacted in forty-seven states
and the District of Columbia.184 Nine states have modified the subsection by adding at the end thereof,
1. “known to the trustee;”185
2. “known to the trustee as determined from information provided by the beneficiaries;”186
180

UPIA, supra note 26, § 2(c), cmt. (Factors affecting investment).
Delaware, Kentucky, and Louisiana have not adopted UPIA § 2(c).
182 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-902(c) (2012), CAL. PROB. CODE § 16047(c) (West 2012),
FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(f) (2012), 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(6) (2011), MD. CODE ANN.,
EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(5) (LexisNexis 2012), MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(2)(c) (2012),
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-603(3) (2011), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-11 (2011)
have replaced “that a trustee shall consider” with “that are appropriate to consider.”
183 Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana and Pennsylvania have not enacted UPIA
§ 2(c)(2). The following five state statutes have removed the words “or deflation”: FLA.
STAT. § 518.11(1)(f), 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(6), MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§ 15-114(c)(5)(iii), MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(2)(c)(2), and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-11.
184 This provision has not been enacted in Georgia, Kentucky and Louisiana.
185 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B § 902(3)(F) (2011); MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(2)(c)(6);
MO. REV. STAT. § 469.902.3(6) (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-9-902(c)(6) (2011).
186 CAL. PROB. CODE § 16047(c)(6); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-603(3)(f).
181
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3. “fiduciary shall have no duty to inquire;”187 or
4. “reasonably known.”188
States have also expanded § 2(c)(6) by elaborating on the nature of the
resources by expanding the reference to include,
1. “related trusts;”189
2. “related trusts, estates, and guardianship;”190
3. “and other income;”191
4. “other investments and resources, whether held in trust or
otherwise;192
5. “and the assets of the beneficiaries;”193
6. “status of related assets of beneficiaries;194 or
7. “including earning capacity.”195
Kansas limits the scope of “beneficiaries” to those “who are eligible
to receive discretionary payments of trust income or principal assets.”196
Some of the states have added to the eight listed factors in UPIA
§ 2(c) by adding one or more of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
187

“size of the portfolio;”197
“nature and estimated duration of the trust;”198
“purposes and estimated duration of the trust;”199
“duty to incur only reasonable and appropriate costs;”200
“needs of its beneficiaries;”201

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(c)(3) (2011).
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(3)(B) (McKinney 2011); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 7203(c)(8) (2011).
189 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541b(c)(6) (2012); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(6)
(2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(4)(B); 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 7203(c)(8); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-11 (2011).
190 FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(f) (2012).
191 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541b(c)(6); FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(f); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(4)(B); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7203(c)(8).
192 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(c)(3) (2011).
193 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 518.11(1)(f); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(6).
194 MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(5)(vii) (LexisNexis 2012).
195 MINN. STAT. § 501B.151(2)(c)(6) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.020(2)(h)
(2012).
196 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a02(c)(6) (2011).
197 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-902(c)(9) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541b(c)(9) (2012);
MO. REV. STAT. § 469.902(3)(9) (2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 112.3(b)(3)(B) (McKinney 2011); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7203(c)(1) (2011).
198 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541b(c)(10); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.902(3)(9); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(3)(B); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7203(c).
199 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-902(c)(10).
200 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(6) (2011).
201 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(a) (2011).
188
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6. “distribution requirements of the governing instrument;”202
7. “any special circumstances;”203
8. “anticipated duration of the account;”204
9. “anticipated duration of the trust;”205 or
10. “reasonableness of any costs associated with the
investment.”206
E. Editorial Changes with Possible Substantive Impact
1. Deletion of “Beneficiaries” in UPIA §§ 1(a), 2(c) and 2(c)(8)
Pursuant to UPIA § 1(a), a trustee owes a duty to “the beneficiaries
of the trust” to comply with the UPIA. UPIA § 2(c) requires the trustee
to consider eight enumerated factors “as are relevant to the trust or its
beneficiaries.” Section 2(c)(8) requires the trustee to consider an asset’s
special relationship or special value to “the purposes of the trust or to
one or more of the beneficiaries.” Maryland and South Dakota have
removed the reference to “beneficiaries” in § 2(c) and have not enacted
§§ 1(a) and 2(c)(8).207 Illinois’ statute does not contain the reference to
“beneficiaries” in § 2(c) or in § 1(a) and has not enacted § 2(c)(8).208
Florida, Minnesota and Pennsylvania have removed the reference to
“beneficiaries” in §§ 1(a) and 2(c) but retain the reference in
§ 2(c)(8).209 Washington has removed the reference to “beneficiaries”
in § 2(c), retained it in § 1(a) and has not enacted § 2(c)(8).210 The intent and impact of these deletions are unknown. Is it possible that the
references to “beneficiaries” were removed simply because they were
deemed redundant. Query whether there was an intent to shift the focus from the beneficiaries to the terms of the trust.211
202
203
204
205
206
207

MO. REV. STAT. § 469.902(3)(9) (2011).
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-340(b)(9) (2011).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3302(a).
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-340(b)(8).
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(5)(vi) (LexisNexis 2012).
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(5); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-11

(2011).
208

760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(1), (6) (2011).
F LA . S TAT . §§ 518.11(1), 518.11(1)(f), 518.11(1)(d) (2012); M INN . S TAT .
§§ 501B.151(a), 501B.151(2)(c), 501B.151(2)(c)(8) (2012); 20 PA. CONST. STAT.
§§ 7201(a), 7203(c), 7203(c)(6) (2011).
210 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.100.010, 11.100.020(2) (2012).
211 Since Illinois and Florida enacted their modern investment statutes prior to the
adoption of the UPIA, one cannot infer that the legislatures of these states intentionally
deleted the UPIA provision.
209
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2. Reference in UPIA § 1(a)
UPIA § 1(a) begins with the phrase “except as otherwise provided
in subsection (b).” Subsection 1(b) provides the prudent investor rule is
a default rule that may be changed by the provisions of a trust. Reading
the two subsections together, a trustee owes a duty to the beneficiaries
to invest and manage trust assets in accordance with the prudent investor rule set forth in the statute except as otherwise provided by the provisions of the trust. Maine and Oregon have replaced the reference in
the introductory phrase to subsection (b) with the state’s enactment of
UPIA § 2.212 The reference to UPIA § 2, which sets forth the standard
of care, appears nonsensical.
3. UPIA § 2 Changes
Because UPIA § 2 is the heart of the UPIA, state statutory modifications to § 2 have greater impact.213 Even small, apparently editorial,
changes may impact how the statutes are interpreted, thereby impacting
the manner in which assets are invested. Some of the more significant
editorial changes to UPIA § 2 are set forth in this Part. For the most
part, only editorial changes occurring in several jurisdictions are
examined.
(a). UPIA § 2(a) Changes
UPIA § 2(a) requires the trustee to consider the “purposes, terms,
distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.” Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania have enacted UPIA § 2(a) but
have deleted the reference to “distribution requirements.”214 Georgia
has adopted UPIA § 2(a) but has deleted “other circumstances.”215
(b). UPIA § 2(c)(4) Changes
UPIA § 2(c)(4) directs a trustee to consider the role that each investment or course of action plays within the overall trust portfolio and
adds “which may include financial assets, interests in closely held enterprises, tangible and intangible personal property, and real property.”
Arizona adds to this list “specialty assets” and “alternative invest212

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 901(1) (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.750(1) (2012).
UPIA, supra note 26, § 2, cmt.
214 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203C, § 3(a) (2011), N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 11-2.3(b)(2) (McKinney 2011), 20 PA. CONST. STAT. § 7203(a) (2011). In fairness, since
New York’s statute was enacted soon after the Commissioners adopted the UPIA, it is
possible that the New York legislature did not intentionally delete the phrase.
215 GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-340(a) (2011).
213
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ments.”216 Of the forty-one states that have enacted the UPIA, thirteen
states have deleted the entire list.217
(c). UPIA § 2(c)(5) Changes
UPIA § 2(c)(5) requires the trustee to consider “the expected total
return from income and the appreciation of capital.” Florida, Illinois,
Maryland and South Dakota have inserted the word “yield” after the
term “income.”218 While apparently innocuous, the insertion of “yield”
does modify the statute.
(d). UPIA § 2(d) Changes
UPIA § 2(d) requires a trustee to “make a reasonable effort to verify facts relevant to the investment and management of trust assets.”
The official comments to the UPIA state, “Subsection (d) carries forward the traditional responsibility of the fiduciary investor to examine
information likely to bear importantly on the value or the security of an
investment – for example, audit reports or records of title.” Twelve
states have not enacted this subsection.219 California, Missouri and
Montana replace “verify” with “ascertain.”220 New Jersey revises the
subsection as follows:
The fiduciary shall take reasonable steps to verify facts relevant to the investment and management of trust assets and
may rely and be fully protected in relying upon statistical, financial, corporate or other information as to a particular investment, and upon ratings or other opinion as to the financial
or other status thereof, contained in or offered by any financial, statistical, investment, rating or other publication or service published for the use of and accepted as reliable by
investors in like investments or upon a copy of the prospectus
216

ARIZ. REV STAT. ANN. § 14-10902(c)(4) (2012).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 16047(c)(4) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(f) (2012);
760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(6) (2011); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 15114(c)(5)(iv) (LexisNexis 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 203C, §§ 3-4 (2011); MINN. STAT.
§ 501B.151(2)(c)(4) (2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.902.3(4) (2011); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 72-34-603(3)(d) (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.3(d)(4) (West 2011); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(b)(3)(B) (McKinney 2011); 20 PA. CONST. STAT.
§ 7203(c)(5) (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-11 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.100.020(1) (2012).
218 FLA. STAT. § 518.11(1)(f); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(a)(6); MD. CODE ANN., EST.
& TRUSTS § 15-114(c)(5)(v); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-11.
219 Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Washington have not enacted UPIA § 2(d).
220 CAL. PROB. CODE § 16047(d); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.902(4) (2011); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-34-603(4).
217
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prepared and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with a new issue.“221
4. UPIA § 4 Changes
UPIA § 4 requires a trustee “within a reasonable time after accepting a trusteeship or receiving trust assets” to review the trust assets.
The Official Comments to UPIA § 4 provide, “The question of what
period of time is reasonable turns on the totality of factors affecting the
asset and the trust.” The comments note that the 1959 Restatement
(Second) of Trusts took the view that a year was ordinarily reasonable
but under certain circumstances a year may be too long. UPIA § 4 does
not define what a reasonable time period is. New Jersey’s statute requires the trustee to act within six months.222
5. UPIA § 10 Changes
UPIA § 10 lists terms or comparable language located in provisions
of a trust which are to be interpreted as invoking the provisions of the
UPIA. The four most common phrases are: “prudent man rule,” “prudent trustee rule,” “prudent person rule,” and “prudent investor rule.”
If a trust contains these terms, the trust invokes the prudent investor
rule unless the trust otherwise provides. Thirty-one states have enacted
a provision identical to UPIA § 10 or made slight editorial modifications.223 Eleven additional states and the District of Columbia have enacted UPIA § 10 but have modified it to some degree.224 Interestingly,
221

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:20-11.3(e).
§ 3B:20-11.7.
223 ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.275 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-906 (2011); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 16053 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1.1-110 (2012); D.C. CODE
§§ 19-1309.01 to 19-1309.06 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 554c-10 (2011); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 68-510 (2012); IND. CODE § 30-4-3.5-10 (2011); IOWA CODE § 633A.4309 (2012);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a10 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 906 (2011); MINN. STAT.
§ 501B.151(7) (2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-619 (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.910
(2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-34-610 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3889 (2011); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 164.775 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:9-906 (2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:20-11.11 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-7-611 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 59-17-06 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.07 (LexisNexis 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit.
60, § 175.70 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-15-10 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-933(L)
(2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-14-112 (2012); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 117.012 (West
2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-907 (LexisNexis 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 906
(2012); W. VA. CODE § 44-6C-10 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 881.01(11) (2011); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 4-10-910 (2011).
224 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-906 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-541j (2012); D.C. CODE
§ 19-1309.06; FLA. STAT. § 518.11(4) (2012); 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(d) (2011); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 203C, § 11 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.1511 (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 36C-9-901(c) (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.775 (2012); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7214
(2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-14 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.11 (2012).
222
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Illinois and South Dakota have enacted the statute but delete the references to “prudent trustee rule” and “prudent investor rule;”225 Florida
has enacted a similar statute but deletes the reference to “prudent man
rule;”226 and Oregon has enacted the statute but deletes the phrase
“prudent person rule.”227 The removal of these phrases substantially
impacts the effective date of the UPIA in these states.
F. Alabama’s Constitutional Restriction
The first sentence of Alabama Code § 19-3B-902(e) provides, “A
trustee may invest in any kind of property or type of investment consistent with the standards of this chapter.” This sentence is identical to
UPIA § 2(e).228 The second sentence of Alabama Code § 19-3B-902(e)
states, “Nothing contained in this section, insofar as such authorization
may be prohibited by the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, shall authorize the investment of trust assets in the stock of any private corporation.” Alabama’s Constitution Art. IV, § 74 and Amend. No. 40,
provide, “No act of the legislature shall authorize the investment of any
trust fund by . . .trustees in the bonds or stock of any private corporation. . ..”229 In the 1930s, five states had similar Constitutional provisions.230 According to one view, the provision was to prohibit the
legislature from passing laws which favored one corporation over another.231 This view is based on an expanded view of the Alabama Supreme Court decision of Sims v. Russell.232 The Court in Sims addresses
whether it was proper for a guardian to secure a loan with a pledge of
stock in a national bank. The Court concluded that a loan secured by a
pledge of stock in a private company differed from a direct investment
in a private company, the latter being prohibited by the Alabama Constitution.233 The Court had previously held that a direct investment by a
guardian in a bond of a private company was not authorized by the Constitution.234 Alabama’s Constitution prohibits the trustee from investing
225

760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5(d); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-5-14.
FLA. STAT. § 518.11(4).
227 OR. REV. STAT. § 130.775.
228 See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-902, Ala. cmt.
229 Constitutional provision first appeared in the Alabama Constitution of 1875. See
Sims v. Russell, 183 So. 862, 864 (Ala. 1938).
230 See Legal Lists in Trust Investment, 49 YALE L.J. 891, 893 n.20 (1940). Constitutional provisions forbidding legislative authorizations of corporate stock as permissible
trust investments were in place in Alabama, Colorado, Montana, Pennsylvania and Wyoming. All of the states, except Alabama, have repealed this Constitutional prohibition.
231 3 AUSTIN W. SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 227.13 (5th ed.
2007).
232 Sims, 183 So. 862.
233 Id. at 864-65.
234 White v. White, 162 So. 368 (Ala. 1935).
226
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in stocks and bonds issued by a private company. Because the Constitutional prohibition is of ancient origin, Alabama’s practitioners draft
trusts to expressly authorize investments in private corporations,
thereby electing out of the default law due to its extremely severe
limitations.
III. SIGNIFICANCE

OF

ANALYSIS

A. Purpose is to Promote Uniformity
Uniform Acts are adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to promote uniformity in the law among
the states on subjects as to which uniformity is desirable and practicable.235 Section 12 of the UPIA provides, “[t]his [Act] shall be applied
and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
with respect to the subject of this [Act] among the States enacting it.”236
The District of Columbia and twenty-five states have enacted UPIA
§ 12 or the similar statute located in UTC § 1101.237 To the extent that a
state has modified the UPIA, consistency is compromised.
235 See NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS CONST. art 1, § 2 available
at http://www.nccusl.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Constitution (last visited Apr.6, 2012).
236 Article 9 of the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”) is reserved for the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. Portions or all of six sections of the UPIA are duplicated in the UTC.
UPIA § 2(f) is similar to UTC § 806. UPIA § 5 is similar to UTC § 802(a). UPIA § 6 is
similar to UTC § 803. UPIA § 7 is similar to UTC § 805. UPIA § 9 is similar to UTC
§ 807. UPIA § 12 is similar to UTC § 1101. Many of those states that have adopted the
UTC have deleted these UPIA sections since similar provisions appear in the UTC. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Maine, North Carolina, North Dakota,
South Carolina, and Vermont have deleted all of the duplicate provisions in the UPIA
that appear in the UTC. Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah have deleted some of the UPIA sections but retain others. Missouri, Michigan, New Mexico,
Tennessee, and Virginia retain many of the UPIA provisions and the UTC provisions.
Duplicative statutes appear in many of the states that have enacted both the UPIA and
the UTC.
237 ALA. CODE § 19-3B-1201 (2012); ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.285 (2012); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 28-73-908 (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-1.1-112 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 45a-541k (2012); D.C. CODE § 19-1311.01 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 68-512; IND.
CODE § 30-4-3.5-12 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-24a12 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B,
§ 907 (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-623 (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 469.912 (2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-38,108 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:11-1101 (2011); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 36C-11-1101 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5809.08(A) (LexisNexis
2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 175.72 (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-15-12 (2011); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-7-933(L) (2011); TEXAS PROP. CODE ANN. § 117.002 (West 2011); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-7-1101(LexisNexis 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 1201 (2012); VA. CODE
ANN. § 26-45.14 (2012); W. VA. CODE § 44-6C-12 (2012); WIS. STAT. § 881.01(13) (2011);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-1101 (2011).
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B. Limited Applicability
A court’s decision in one jurisdiction may serve to guide a court in
another jurisdiction if the law is similar or identical in both states. This
principle is clearly applicable in the District of Columbia and those
twenty-five states that have adopted UPIA § 12 or its counter-part in
the UTC.238 While the decision of a court in one jurisdiction will not
bind the court of another jurisdiction, it effectuates the application of
UPIA § 12 if the courts strive to uniformly apply the law. To the extent
the state’s UPIA deviates from the UPIA, a court decision interpreting
the state’s modified UPIA will limit its application in another jurisdiction. For example, an opinion from a state granting preference for inception assets would have limited applicability outside of the subject
state due to the uniqueness of the state’s provision.239
C. Multi-State Trustees
Trustees operating in multiple jurisdictions should bear in mind that
a super-majority of the states that have enacted the UPIA have modified it to a certain degree. Many of the modifications are editorial, but
many are significant.240 In light of the uniqueness of many of the states’
UPIA modifications, multi-state trustees should develop policies and
procedures that recognize the numerous unique state-enacted
provisions.
Legal counsel advising multi-state trustees should also bear in mind
the changes that the states have made to the UPIA. Rather than making broad statements concerning investment law, legal counsel should
focus on the particulars of the trust and the peculiarities of each state’s
UPIA.
D. Multi-State Analysis Can Assist in Interpreting State’s
Modification to UPIA
An analysis of the various states’ modifications to the UPIA can
assist in interpreting each state’s statutes. Many of the states have
adopted identical changes to the same UPIA section. These multi-state
changes reflect heightened emphasis or a deviation from some of the
principles of the UPIA. For example, every state permits a grantor to
238

See supra note 237.
See supra Part I(D)(2).
240 Only Colorado has enacted the UPIA with no changes whatsoever. New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island and West Virginia have enacted the UPIA with very minor
editorial changes. Arkansas, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, North Dakota and Vermont have made minor changes. The remaining thirty-three states that have enacted the
UPIA and the District of Columbia have made at least one significant modification. For
statutory references see supra note 32.
239
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expand, restrict, eliminate or otherwise alter the provisions of the
UPIA. In many states, the grantor must do so expressly.241 A multistate analysis can therefore assist in interpreting the state’s modified
UPIA.
E. Modifications Impact Investing
Some of the modifications to the UPIA made by the state legislatures impact the manner in which trustees invest trust assets. Even
though the UPIA is a default rule which grantors may modify in the
trust agreement, the UPIA default rules impact investing.242 Professors
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff have demonstrated that a state’s adoption of
the UPIA increased the percentage of stocks held by institutional trustees in private trusts.243 It is reasonable to assume that a state modified
the UPIA in order to impact the manner in which trust assets are invested in that state. As set forth supra at Part I(D)(2), numerous states
have relieved trustees from diversifying inception assets. Presumably,
the legislatures in these states concluded that grantors owning concentrations would want their trustees to be relieved of any duty to diversify
those concentrations.244 In some instances, the concentration may represent a substantial portion and in a few cases nearly the entire trust.
Retaining that concentration exposes the trust to uncompensated risk
and prevents the trustee from minimizing firm-specific risk by investing
in assets which are negatively correlated to the concentration.245 Exempting trustees from the duty to diversify inception assets significantly
241

See supra Part II(A).
Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent Is Modern Prudent
Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 893 (2010).
243 Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation? 50 J.L. & ECON. 681 (2007); In his article,
Martin D. Begleiter discusses a study he conducted in which he submitted a survey to 239
trust departments in Iowa after that state’s adoption of modern investment statute in
1992. Begleiter concluded that “the surveys indicate, that, in regard to personal trusts,
corporate trustees under the Iowa intermediate statute do use modern financial theory to
formulate trust investment portfolios, but a significant percentage of the respondents remain concerned about liability for using new investment vehicles and techniques.” Martin
D. Begleiter, Does the Prudent Investor Need the Uniform Prudent Investor Act –An Emprical Study of Trust Investment Practices, 51 ME. L. REV. 27, 30 (1999). Bevis Longstreth notes “specific authorization in the trust instrument to invest in certain innovative
or novel forms of investment are apparently frequently ignored by trustees unless the
investment category is otherwise generally accepted,” LONGSTRETH, supra note 5, at 17.
244 “[S]tatutory provisions aim to effect the unexpressed intention of the settlor. . .”
Statutory Specification of Trustees’ Investments, 49 HARV. L. REV. 821 n.1 (1936) [hereinafter Statutory Specification].
245 Neils Bekkers, Ronald Q. Doeswijk & Trevin W. Lam, Strategic Asset Allocation:
Determining the Optimal Portfolio with Ten Asset Classes, 12 J. WEALTH MGMT. 61, 67
(2009). For an excellent discussion of how stocks with different correlations reduce risk,
242
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impacts the manner in which the trust assets are invested. Many of the
other changes discussed in this article, made by the states such as Montana which has carved out a special provision for certain assets, impact
trust investing.246 To date, no study has been published which examines
whether the state modifications discussed herein actually impact investing. Thus, at the present time, we are left with theories and our own
personal observations.
F. Modifications Impact Litigation
Although the UPIA is a default rule which the grantor can modify,
it establishes a legal norm which frames the level of care required by a
trustee.247 As examined supra at Part II(B), several states have modified the UPIA to alter the standard of care required under certain
circumstances.248
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
During the last quarter-century, a revolution has occurred in trust
investment law. All of the states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation incorporating modern portfolio theory into the law.
While the UPIA has brought a degree of consistency, numerous states
have modified the UPIA and some of those modifications substantially
impact the manner in which trust assets are invested. Looking forward,
the legislators in Alabama may wish to consider initiating an amendment to their constitution to eliminate their anachronistic investment
prohibition. The legislators in the five states that give preference for
inception assets may wish to revisit the preference given to these assets
and if they wish to retain the preference they may wish to clarify
whether the preference should only be given to grantor owned assets.249
Legislators in Florida, Illinois and Maryland should reconsider whether
the business judgment standard is the appropriate standard in a trust
context.250 The legislators in the eight states which have modified
UPIA § 2(c) by shifting the standard from “shall” to “may” should consider returning to a mandatory requirement.251 Kentucky and Maryland
see Edward A. Moses, J. Clay Singleton & Stewart A. Marshall III, Modern Portfolio
Theory and the Prudent Investor Act, 30 ACTEC J. 166 (2004).
246 See supra Part I(D)(3)(a).
247 Sterk, supra note 242, at 893
248 Legislatures have a long history of enacting statutes which modify the standard of
care established by the common law. For example, in part, legal lists were enacted to
provide security to trustees from surcharge actions. See Statutory Specification, supra
note 244, at 824-25.
249 See supra Part I(D)(2).
250 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
251 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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may wish to apply the UPIA to individual trustees.252 The Uniform
Law Commission may wish to consider the complexities involving life
insurance held by trustees. Arguably, some type of reform is needed
since one-fifth of the states have enacted legislation addressing the issue.253 All of the legislatures, except Colorado’s which has adopted the
UPIA without modification, may wish to revisit their version of the
UPIA to see if their modifications are still consistent with their original
intended purposes. The legislatures should refrain from making unnecessary editorial changes which may unintentionally and adversely impact trust investing. Arguably, the desire for uniformity should not
trump the rich diversity of our individual states; however, legislatures
should carefully consider the full ramifications of deviating from the
uniform statute and if they wish to do so, carefully consider the impact
even small changes have on the overall statute.
While substantial diversity does exist across the United States, it
can be said, with a few notable exceptions, that trustees in the United
States must invest in accordance with modern investment principles.

252
253

See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I(D)(3)(b).

